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Emotion in inter-group relations

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The study of inter-group relations has seen a renewed emphasis on emotion. Various frameworks converge on the general conceptualisation of group-level emotions, with respect to their antecedent appraisals and implications for inter-group relations. However, specific points of divergence remain unresolved regarding terminology and operationalisation, as well as the role of self-relevance (e.g., self-categorisation, in-group identification) in moderating the strength of emotion that individuals feel about groups and their inter-relations. In this chapter we first present a typology of group-level emotions in order to classify current conceptual and empirical approaches, differentiating them along the dimensions of the (individual or group) subject and object of emotion. The second section reviews evidence for the claim that individuals feel stronger group-level emotions about things that are relevant to their self-concept, with emphasis on three indicators of self-relevance: domain relevance, self-categorisation as an in-group member, and in-group identification. Implications for, and future directions in, the study of emotion in inter-group relations are discussed.

Keywords: Emotion; Group identification; Intergroup relations; Self-categorisation; Self-relevance.

Over the past 15 years theory and research on inter-group relations has been marked by a greater attention to emotion. Researchers, mainly in Europe, Australasia, and the Americas, have applied the concept of emotion to a wide range of inter-group phenomena, including stereotypes and prejudice towards out-groups (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Dijker, 1987; Fiske,

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Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), in-group harm of out-groups (e.g., Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003), third-party harm of out-groups (e.g., Leach, Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003), and out-group advantage (Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2007b). Recent work has also examined emotions about in-group attributes (Bizman, Yinon, & Krotman, 2001; Petrocelli & E. R. Smith, 2005), in-group deprivation (e.g., Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004), and in-group advantage (e.g., Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005; Swim & Miller, 1999). Furthermore, emotions are thought to be important to inter-group competition and conflict (e.g., Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003; Mackie, Devos, & E. R. Smith, 2000), as well as inter-group reconciliation (e.g., Tam et al., 2007; Wohl & Branscombe, 2005).

Although there is an obvious diversity in the approaches listed above, current research on emotion in inter-group relations tends to agree on three general principles. First, it is typically posited that individuals may experience emotions about their in-group, an out-group, and/or the inter-relation between groups (for reviews, see Mackie & E. R. Smith, 2002; Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, 2005; Tiedens & Leach, 2004). These group-level emotions are thought to be distinguishable from individual-level emotions and to have particular relevance to inter-group relations because they operate at the group level (E. R. Smith, 1993; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). Runciman (1966) made this argument some time ago in an effort to show that dissatisfaction about the relative deprivation of one's group, rather than one's individual deprivation, was most relevant to the prediction of collective action against inter-group inequality. A great deal of subsequent research has supported his view (for a review, see H. J. Smith & Ortiz, 2002).

Second, current work tends to agree that distinct emotions are associated with specific patterns of appraisal (or subjective interpretation) of an in-group, an out-group, and/or an inter-group relation. This reflects the influence of the appraisal theory approach (see Frijda, 1986; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001) to emotion in general (for discussions, see E. R. Smith, 1993; H. J. Smith & Kessler, 2004). However, work on emotion in inter-group relations focuses on appraisals at the group level, rather than the individual-level appraisals prevalent in more general research on emotion (for discussions, see Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002; E. R. Smith, 1993; Tiedens & Leach, 2004).

The third general principle underlying most current work on emotion in inter-group relations is that specific emotions can predict specific (attitudinal and behavioural) responses to an in-group, an out-group, and/or the inter-relation between groups (for reviews, see Leach et al., 2002; Mackie & E. R. Smith, 2002; Parkinson et al., 2005). This principle is based in more general emotion theory, which views emotions as specific motivational states

that make people ready to take specific action to address the cause of the their emotion (Frijda, 1986; Tiedens & Leach, 2004).

Together these three principles in work on emotion in inter-group relations suggest that specific patterns of group-level appraisal, and the distinct emotions with which they are associated, offer a nuanced explanation of how individuals evaluate, and act within, their inter-group relations. This specificity offers an advantage over the more generic notions of prejudice or group bias that have long dominated work on inter-group relations (Mackie & E. R. Smith, 2002; E. R. Smith, 1993; Tiedens & Leach, 2004). For instance, individuals' anger about the perceived mistreatment of their in-group indicates their displeasure at being treated in a way they appraise as morally inappropriate. As such, this anger may be expected to predict confrontation of the wrongdoer (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2004; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). In contrast, individuals' shame about their in-group's immoral treatment of another party indicates their displeasure at treating others in a way that is appraised as morally inappropriate. As such, this shame may be expected to predict avoidance of those wronged (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005).

Despite broad agreement on the three general principles of emotion in inter-group relations, there is a good deal of divergence in the ways in which these emotions are theorised and studied. For instance, many different names, definitions, and operationalisations of group-level emotions have been offered. As a result, it is unclear how the "inter-group emotion" identified by some researchers differs from the "vicarious", "group-based", or "collective" emotion studied by other researchers. There is also divergence in the way that researchers have examined the proposition that individuals feel stronger group-level emotions about group and inter-group phenomena that are particularly self-relevant. Work on emotion in inter-group relations has used various indicators of self-relevance, including relevance of the domain to individuals, self-categorisation as an in-group member, and identification with an in-group. These different indicators of self-relevance often have different associations with emotion in inter-group relations. For example, self-categorisation as a member of an in-group who has mistreated an out-group appears to be necessary to group-level guilt or shame, but identification with such an in-group has been shown to have a positive association to feelings of guilt and shame in some studies, whereas others have found a negative association, or often no association at all.

In this review we take stock of the literature and attempt to reconcile some of the most important divergences. In the first section, we present a typology of group-level emotions in order to classify current work. Building on Parkinson et al. (2005), we distinguish between the individual and group *subject* of the emotion (i.e., who is feeling the emotion—an individual

as an individual, or an individual as an in-group member) and the *object* of emotion (i.e., what the emotion is felt about, an individual, in-group, or out-group). This distinction is used to produce five classes of group-level emotion that may have implications for inter-group relations. In the second section, we review the various indicators of self-relevance and attempt to clarify why and how they affect the strength of individuals' group-level emotions. At the end of each of the first two sections, we outline directions for future research. We conclude the chapter with a discussion of the role of the self in group-level emotion.

CLASSIFICATION OF GROUP-LEVEL EMOTIONS

Likely due to the recent explosion of work on emotion in inter-group relations, there is little consensus regarding terminology. At present, terms such as *group emotions* (Parkinson et al., 2005), *collective emotions* (Doosje et al., 1998), *vicarious emotions* (Lickel et al., 2005), *inter-group emotions* (Mackie et al., 2000), and *group-based emotions* (Bizman et al., 2001; Iyer et al., 2003) seem to be competing for primacy. This variation in terminology reflects the particular theoretical or meta-theoretical perspective upon which each line of research is based. The terms also seem to reflect differences in the level of analysis at which emotion is conceptualised (e.g., intra-group or inter-group).

The use of multiple terms has the potential to create conceptual confusion, for at least two reasons. First, several of the terms are limited to specific phenomena and thus cannot be used more generally. For example, the term *vicarious emotion* appears to be specific to situations where an individual feels an emotion as a result of their inter-personal relationship to *another individual* who shares a group membership with them (Lickel et al., 2005). Vicarious emotion has not been used to describe emotion about an in-group's relation to an out-group, or about an individual's emotion about an in-group as a whole.

Second, there is divergence in the operationalisation of group-level emotion that appears to follow from the inconsistency in conceptualisation and terminology. Thus, researchers tend to operationalise the emotions they study in a way consistent with their own particular conceptualisation, but in a way inconsistent with others' conceptualisation. For example, most work on *inter-group emotions* specifies an out-group as the object of the emotion, and an individual who self-categorises as a group member (rather than as an individual) as the subject of the emotion (e.g., Mackie et al., 2000). Work on *group-based emotions*, however, tends to specify either an in-group *or* an out-group as the object of the emotion (e.g., Iyer et al., 2003; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). Even the same term is not necessarily operationalised in the same way from one

study to the next. For example, some investigations of "inter-group emotions" only specify the out-group object of the emotion, without making explicit that the subject of the emotion sees him/herself as an in-group member (e.g., Crisp, Heuston, Farr, & Turner, 2007).

Given the problems associated with the use of multiple terms for group-level emotion, it is surprising that so little attention has been given to integrating the various conceptual frameworks behind these terms (but see Parkinson et al., 2005). It is also surprising that so little work has compared the various operationalisations of group-level emotions. Thus, in this section we build on Parkinson et al.'s (2005) distinction between the subject and the object of emotion to classify five types of group-level emotion identified in existing conceptual and empirical work. Below we present our rationale for choosing these two dimensions before describing the five types of group-level emotion they produce.

The subject of emotion

Parkinson et al.'s (2005) framework identifies the subject of feeling as an important determinant of emotion at the group level. The subject of the emotion specifies who is feeling the emotion—someone who sees him/herself as a unique individual (i.e., in terms of personal identity), or someone who psychologically includes him/herself in a specific group (i.e., in terms of group identity). In psychology, emotion has tended to be conceptualised as an individual-level phenomenon, whereby isolated individuals feel emotion about their *personal* concerns and experiences (see Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 1986; Scherer et al., 2001). More recently, a growing body of work has emphasised the ways in which individuals may experience emotions about their relationships with other individuals, including fellow in-group members (for reviews see Parkinson et al., 2005; Tiedens & Leach, 2004). This includes the proliferation of theory and research on emotion in inter-group relations. For example, E. R. Smith (1993) built on relative deprivation theory (Runciman, 1966), social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and self-categorisation theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) to propose that individuals can experience emotions on the basis of their group membership. His influential inter-group emotion theory specifies that the subject of a group-level emotion must be an individual who perceives him/herself as a member of an in-group.

Why should the self-categorisation of the subject feeling the emotion matter? Theory suggests that self-categorisation as an individual or a group member will (at least partly) determine how people appraise, feel about, and act towards an event. When people self-categorise as group members rather than as individuals, they tend to think, feel, and act in accordance with their

group-level self, rather than their individual-level self. Self-categorisation at the group level shifts attention away from individuals' personal goals, interests, and values, and towards in-group goals, interests, values, and norms (Turner et al., 1987). As a result, level of self-categorisation should shape the types of appraisals that individuals make about an event, which should in turn shape their emotional response to this event (Runciman, 1966; E. R. Smith, 1993). Evidence for the distinction between individual-level and group-level emotion comes from several studies.

Doosje et al. (1998, Study 1) manipulated whether individuals and/or their quasi-minimal in-group showed bias against an out-group. When the in-group was biased, participants' personal bias did not increase feelings of guilt and regret in response. Thus, individuals' guilt appeared to be based solely on their *in-group's* mistreatment of an out-group. Another study (van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, in press, Study 2) showed that simply making in-group membership salient in a general way can actually increase the degree of emotion about the subsequent fate of this in-group. More specifically, van Zomeren et al. made salient either the individual-level or group-level self by asking students to describe a typical day in their life as an individual, or as a student. When the group-level self was made salient, participants reported greater anger in response to evidence that students at their university were treated unfairly by the university.

Other evidence that emotions can operate at a distinct group level comes from two recent studies by E. R. Smith, Seger, and Mackie (2007). Participants were asked how much they generally felt a list of positive and negative emotions. However, in one section of the study participants were asked how much they felt these emotions "as an individual" and in other sections of the study they were asked how much they felt these emotions as a member of a specific group (i.e., as citizens of the United States or as affiliates of the Democratic or Republican political party). The emotions that individuals generally felt as individuals correlated moderately to those they felt as a group member (*r*s ranged from to .25 to .52). This is not surprising, as people who are generally fearful or joyful as individuals are also likely to be so as group members. However, E. R. Smith et al. (2007) found that participants' group-level emotion was independently associated with the average level of this emotion felt by other in-group members. This suggests that individuals' group-level emotions are determined partly by their individual-level emotions and partly by the norm for the group-level emotion in their in-group.

When the degree of emotion across levels was compared, E. R. Smith et al. (2007) found that individual-level emotion differed from group-level emotion. Participants reported more pride, disgust, and fear as Americans than as individuals. Participants also reported more anger at out-groups as members of a political party than as an individual. In addition, nearly all the

group-level emotions were more strongly correlated to in-group identification than were the individual-level emotions. This is further support for the argument that individual-level and group-level emotions are distinct from each other.

It is important to note, however, that some work on emotion in inter-group relations does not (conceptually or empirically) specify that the subject of the emotion is an in-group member. These approaches seem to allow for the possibility that those who experience group-level emotions can see themselves as unique individuals, rather than psychologically including themselves in a particular in-group. For example, some work on the emotions in prejudice clearly specifies an out-group as the target of emotion, but does not empirically establish whether the subject of the emotion is an isolated individual, or an individual who perceives him/herself as an in-group member (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Fiske et al., 2002). Yet these emotions have clear implications for inter-group relations, as they can influence individuals' attitudes and intentions towards the (out-group) object of the emotion. As such, a comprehensive classification of group-level emotions should also include emotions felt at the individual level about groups and about inter-group relations. Thus, the object of emotion is also important to an understanding of emotion in inter-group relations.

The object of emotion

The second dimension along which we differentiate between group-level emotions is the object of the emotion. This distinction is important because emotions directed at different targets will have different implications for inter-group relations. Parkinson et al. (2005) made the distinction between emotions directed at individuals and emotions directed at groups, and proposed that emotions directed at groups should be more relevant to inter-group relations. In an extension of this framework, we further differentiate between emotions directed towards in-group and out-group objects. This is important for at least two reasons.

First, some emotions with important consequences for inter-group relations tend to be experienced specifically about an in-group or out-group, rather than being directed at both or at their inter-relation (Leach et al., 2002). Evidence for this point can be found in our studies on group-based guilt and sympathy (Iyer et al., 2003, Study 2). European American students were given a measure of perceived racial discrimination in the United States that manipulated whether their focus of attention was their in-group or an African American out-group (see also Powell et al., 2005). Thus, half the participants completed items addressing European Americans' role in perpetuating racial discrimination in the United States (i.e., self-focused statements that European Americans discriminate). The remaining

participants completed items describing the racial discrimination experienced by African Americans in the United States (i.e., other-focused statements that African Americans are discriminated against). Figure 1 presents a model that shows the effects of this manipulation on participants' guilt and sympathy, as well as their support for two different policies regarding racial discrimination. Structural equation modelling was used to assess the expected associations between the measured variables. The model shown in Figure 1 fit the data very well, whereas alternative models that ordered these variables in a different way fit less well.

As shown in Figure 1, participants in the self-focus condition experienced more guilt, whereas participants in the other-focus condition experienced more sympathy. These emotions, in turn, had distinct implications for participants' support for policies to address racial discrimination. Consistent with hypotheses, guilt predicted support for a compensatory policy that sought to provide restitution to African Americans for the harm done by racial discrimination. In contrast, sympathy predicted support for policy that aimed to help African Americans by increasing the number of opportunities available to them.

Iyer et al.'s (2003) results have recently been corroborated by Powell et al. (2005) and extended by Harth, Kessler, and Leach (2008). Harth et al. led individuals to believe either that their in-group was *advantaged* relative to an out-group, or that the out-group was *disadvantaged* relative to the in-group. As far as we are aware this is the only research on emotion in inter-group relations that experimentally established inequality between real groups, rather than focusing participants' attention on different aspects of a



Figure 1. Structural model of relationships between focus of attention, belief in discrimination, group-based emotions, and support for affirmative action policies (Iyer et al., 2003, Study 2; $N = 250$). Standardised parameter estimates are shown. Focus manipulation included as a categorical variable (1 = self-focus, 2 = other-focus). $^{+}p < .10$, $^{*}p < .05$. Dashed lines indicate relationships that are not statistically reliable.

well-known inequality. In two studies, the in-group of psychology students was said to have unequal employment opportunities compared to pedagogy students, and in a third study local students were said to have unequal access to facilities compared with immigrant adolescents. When individuals were told that their in-group had an (illegitimate) *advantage* they felt more guilt. However, when individuals were told that the out-group had a (illegitimate) *disadvantage* they felt more sympathy. This sympathy about illegitimate out-group disadvantage predicted less group bias and greater willingness to help the out-group by contributing money and sharing facilities. Thus, taken together, the available findings indicate that guilt and sympathy are directed at different objects and thus have distinct implications for inter-group relations. This underlines the importance of specifying the object of group-level emotion.

Even a single emotion can be directed at different objects when it is based in different appraisals. The object of the emotion should determine its effect on inter-group relations (for a discussion, see Leach et al., 2002). This is illustrated in Leach et al.'s (2006, 2007b) recent studies of anger about inter-group inequality. They asked non-Aboriginal Australians to indicate the degree to which their in-group is advantaged or disadvantaged compared to Aborigines, and how angry they felt about this. Although Aborigines suffer severe structural disadvantage and are worse off in nearly every domain of life, many non-Aborigines appraise their in-group as unfairly disadvantaged compared to Aborigines (who are believed to benefit from government handouts). Leach et al. (2007b) found this appraisal of (unfair) *in-group disadvantage* to be most prevalent among those higher in symbolic racism against Aborigines ($\lambda = .59$). And, as suggested by relative deprivation theory and symbolic racism theory, this appraisal of in-group disadvantage was strongly associated with anger ($\beta = .56$). This anger about in-group disadvantage predicted a willingness to engage in concrete political action, such as protest and voting, to *oppose* government restitution to Aborigines ($\beta = .57$; see also Leach et al., 2006, Study 1). An alternative model that did not specify anger as a mediator of the association between relative deprivation and the willingness for political action fit the data much less well.

Interestingly, in parallel studies, Leach et al. (2006; Studies 1 and 3) showed that non-Aborigines who appraised their in-group as unfairly advantaged over Aborigines also reported feeling anger about this inter-group appraisal (Study 1 $\beta = .36$, Study 3 $\beta = .21$). However, anger *about in-group advantage* predicted a willingness for political action to *support* government restitution to Aborigines (Study 1 $\beta = .51$, Study 3 $\beta = .32$). Thus, non-Aborigines' appraisal of their inter-group relation with Aborigines determined whether their anger fuelled a willingness for political action in opposition to, or support of, restitution. These two papers show that when the antecedent appraisal established in-group *advantage* as the object of

anger, this emotion predicted a willingness to act *benevolently* towards the disadvantaged out-group. When the antecedent appraisal established in-group *disadvantage* as the object of anger, this emotion predicted a willingness to act *malevolently* towards the advantaged out-group.

Recently, Iyer et al. (2007) extended this line of argument by showing that the object of group-level anger can also be assessed by asking individuals about the target of their anger. Thus, in one study, Iyer et al. (2007, Study 2) presented British students with information about their country's role in creating problems in post-war Iraq, and manipulated the extent to which the British national image was threatened as a result. They then assessed the extent to which participants' anger about post-war conditions in Iraq was directed at three different objects: British people, the British government, and the American government. As shown in the structural equation model in Figure 2, the threat to the in-group's image increased anger at the two in-group objects (i.e., the British people and British government), but not anger at the out-group object (i.e., the American government). This is further evidence that an in-group can be an object of anger, even though out-groups may be the more typical objects.

The specific implications of the anger directed at these three different objects are also evident in Figure 2. The anger directed at the two in-group objects was uniquely associated with intentions to advocate for British compensation to Iraq. In contrast, other-focused anger at the American government predicted intentions to advocate for confrontation of those responsible for conditions in Iraq. Thus, the effects of anger were dependent on its appraisal basis as well as its object.



Figure 2. Structural model of relationships between image threat manipulation, emotions, and action intentions (Iyer et al., 2007, Study 2; $N = 170$). Standardised parameter estimates are shown. Image threat manipulation included as a categorical variable (0 = low image threat, 1 = high image threat). $^{+}p < .10$, $^{*}p < .05$. Faint lines indicate relationships that are not statistically reliable.

Five types of group-level emotions

Below we describe the five types of group-level emotions that are specified along the dimensions of emotion subject and object (see Table 1), and consider the potential implications of each for inter-group relations. We review existing conceptual and empirical approaches to group-level emotion that fit within each cell. We conclude this section by highlighting questions for future research.

1. Inter-group emotions (out-group object, in-group subject)

Emotions should have the most straightforward implications for inter-group relations when they are experienced by individuals who psychologically include themselves in an in-group and have an out-group as the object of their emotion. The in-group subject and the out-group object of these emotions require an evaluation of the inter-group relation and context. Such emotions may be experienced about an out-group's character or circumstances relative to the in-group, or about the actions of the out-group and its implications for the in-group. As a result, the goals and actions associated with such emotions should have direct consequences for the inter-group relation.

Theoretical frameworks of group-level emotions have been clearest and most specific in conceptualising emotions felt by an in-group subject about an out-group object. In an influential paper, E. R. Smith (1993) suggested that attention to emotional reactions to out-groups could make a substantial contribution to the study of prejudice and inter-group relations, as such responses are more specific than (positive) group favouritism or (negative) group devaluation. E. R. Smith, Mackie, and colleagues subsequently developed a model of inter-group emotions that conceptualises the

TABLE 1
Typology of group-level emotions

		SUBJECT	
		Group	*Individual*
OBJECT	*Out-group*	Intergroup emotions	Personal emotions directed at out-groups
	In-group	Group-based emotions directed at in-groups	Personal emotions directed at in-groups
	Individual	Group-based emotions directed at individuals	(Interpersonal emotions)

phenomenon as emotions felt as in-group members and targeted at out-groups (see Mackie & E. R. Smith, 2002; Mackie, Silver, & E. R. Smith, 2004). Similarly, Parkinson et al. (2005, Chapter 5) define inter-group emotion as emotional reactions to out-group members that are in some way based in the experience of in-group membership. Thus, according to prevailing views, inter-group emotions reflect two related components: (1) self-categorisation as an in-group member and (2) a reaction to an out-group given its relationship to the in-group.

Empirical studies of inter-group emotion operationalise this construct in various ways. Some studies appear to make individuals' membership in an in-group clear and to assess emotions about this in-group's relation to an out-group. For example, Maitner, Mackie, and E. R. Smith (2006) asked US participants to rate how they would feel if "a terrorist group *from another country* attacked *your* country" (p. 722, italics added). This operationalisation of inter-group emotions appears to satisfy the conceptual criteria for the term, as it specifies an inter-group relation that includes the in-group subject and out-group object of the emotions.

Other studies that claim to investigate inter-group emotion are less direct in making participants' self-categorisation as in-group members explicit in the emotional experience. Many studies assess emotional reactions to an inter-group context while only implying participants' in-group membership. For example, in the context of "the Troubles" in Northern Ireland, Tam et al. (2007) asked Protestants and Catholics to indicate how much they felt various emotions "when thinking about members of the other community" (p. 124). And after a series of local football (soccer) matches in the UK, Crisp et al. (2007) asked supporters to indicate "their emotional reactions . . . to the results of each match" (p. 16). Although these studies make a particular inter-group relation salient or ask for emotional reactions to an out-group, they do not ask participants to self-categorise as in-group members, nor do they assess the extent to which individuals are including themselves as part of the in-group. Thus, it is unclear to what degree the emotions reported are inter-group in nature. These studies presume that objective group membership is guiding individuals' emotion without directly assessing whether individuals are subjectively categorising themselves as in-group members.

Other studies direct participants to self-categorise as group members, but do not assess self-categorisation. In such cases, it is unclear whether self-categorisation remained salient during participants' reports of experienced emotion: did they, in fact, experience these emotions *as group members*? For example, participants in Mackie et al.'s (2000) studies were directed to categorise themselves into one of two opinion groups, and were then asked to rate the extent to which "the other group made them feel" various emotions. In two scenario studies, Garcia, Miller, E. R. Smith, and Mackie

(2006) asked participants to imagine themselves as members of a group who received a compliment or insult from someone who was presumably an out-group member. Participants were then asked to indicate, "to what extent the scenario made you feel" several emotions. Across these various studies, it is entirely possible that participants are reporting the emotions they feel as individuals, rather than as members of an in-group. We discuss this set of emotions in the next cell of the typology.

2. Personal emotions directed at out-groups (out-group object, individual subject)

Frameworks of inter-group emotion have their conceptual roots in self-categorisation theory and social identity theory. Thus, there has been a fairly clear distinction drawn between emotions experienced at the individual level (with individual subjects and objects) and emotions experienced at the group level (where subjects are group members and objects are group members or entire groups). This demarcation has resulted in little conceptual or empirical attention to the intersection of individual and group levels of analysis in the study of group-level emotions. For instance, little work has considered whether emotions felt by individual subjects about out-groups may have implications for inter-group relations.

In a key exception, however, Simon (1997) presented an intriguing thesis on *quasi-intergroup situations*, where people who self-categorise at the individual level may perceive others as members of an out-group, without necessarily including themselves in an in-group. In line with this view, we propose that emotions felt about out-group objects should have important consequences for inter-group relations, even when they are experienced by subjects acting as individuals rather than as group members. When the object of an emotion is an out-group, the emotion is based in group-level appraisals, even in cases where they are made by individuals who do not see themselves as members of an in-group. Thus, the goals and action intentions associated with these emotions should be directed at the out-group or the inter-group context in general. As a result, it is important to include such emotions in a classification of group-level emotions.

Given the lack of theoretical attention to personal emotions directed at out-groups, it is not surprising that there is little direct empirical evidence to support their conceptualisation. To our knowledge, no research has sought to demonstrate that emotions about an out-group that are clearly felt by an individual (as opposed to a group member) can have implications for group-level attitudes, goals, action intentions, or behaviour. Rather, there is indirect evidence for this idea from studies showing that individuals feel emotions about an out-group when they are not explicitly directed to self-categorise as a member of an in-group.

For instance, emotions that reflect concern about the perceived traits or actions of an out-group (e.g., anger, disgust, fear) have important implications for prejudice and discrimination in inter-group contexts (Dijker, 1987; E. R. Smith, 1993). However, measures used to assess such emotions typically do little to emphasise individuals' psychological inclusion in a distinct in-group (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Dijker, 1987; Fiske et al., 2002). These studies simply ask participants to indicate the extent to which they experience specific emotions about an out-group. For example, Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) ask participants to report the extent to which they experience various feelings "when thinking about a particular group and its members" (p. 776). Emotions that follow from stereotypes and perceived threat could therefore be experienced by individual group members or by individuals alone.

Similarly, other-focused emotions that indicate an anti-prejudiced orientation towards out-groups may have little to do with individual membership in an in-group. For instance, while individuals' sympathy towards victims of racial discrimination reflects a feeling about an entire out-group (e.g., Iyer et al., 2003; Harth et al., 2008), this emotion does not necessarily implicate the in-group as well. Indeed, as an other-focused feeling, sympathy should have little to do with an individual's in-group membership (Leach et al., 2002). Although individuals' emotions about out-groups are not necessarily based on in-group membership or an inter-group relation, they should have *implications* for inter-group relations. For instance, individuals' sympathy for a disadvantaged group may motivate a desire to help improve its low-status position (e.g., Iyer et al., 2003; Stürmer, Snyder, & Omoto, 2005).

Another set of studies on vicarious emotion—felt on behalf of another's actions or circumstances—provides additional indirect evidence for our conceptualisation of group-directed personal emotion. Batson and collaborators have shown that taking the perspective of a member of a stigmatised out-group is an important basis of sympathetic feelings (e.g., Batson et al., 1997). In these experiments participants were directed to take either an objective view of a member of a stigmatised group (e.g., HIV-positive or homeless people), or to take the perspective of the group member by imagining their feelings and experiences. Participants in the perspective-taking condition reported more sympathetic feelings and more positive attitudes towards the stigmatised group as a whole, compared to participants in the objective condition. Thus, it appears that taking the perspective of a single member of an out-group can improve individuals' emotional and attitudinal orientation towards an entire group.

Although such perspective-taking manipulations seem to influence attitudes and behaviour towards stigmatised others, there is no clear evidence that the resultant sympathy is experienced by individuals who are

psychologically including themselves in an in-group. These studies have taken an individual-level approach in directing individuals to take the perspective of an individual out-group member. Thus, participants may empathise and feel sympathy for out-group members from the perspective of *individual* subjects, without any reference to their own in-group membership. Indeed, sympathy is typically conceptualised as an other-focused emotion with more emphasis on the suffering other than on oneself (see Batson, 1998).

3. Group-based emotions directed at in-groups (in-group object, in-group subject)

A third set of group-level emotions is characterised by an in-group object as well as an in-group subject. Individual group members may experience emotions about their in-group's character, circumstances, or position (including its treatment by others); or the actions undertaken by the group or a few of its members. Given that an inter-group context is not necessarily required for these emotions, we use the term ''group-based'' (rather than ''inter-group'') emotions to reflect the subject's self-categorisation as a group member. Along the same lines, emotions directed at in-groups may not necessarily have implications for inter-group relations. It is likely only when the in-group is being appraised in an inter-group context that the resulting emotion will have consequences for out-group attitudes and action intentions.

Various frameworks of group-level emotions may be classified as group-based emotions directed at in-groups. These include work on *group-based emotion* felt on the basis of one's group membership (e.g., Bizman et al., 2001; Gordijn, Wigboldus, & Yzerbyt, 2001; Kessler & Hollbach, 2005) and *collective emotion* experienced on the basis of one's group identity (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2006). These various emotions can be experienced about an in-group's traits and actions, as well as its circumstances. We review the empirical evidence for each of these in turn.

Emotion about in-group traits and actions. Several studies have asked individuals how they feel, *as in-group members*, about the attributes of their group. Group members who considered the perceived discrepancy between their in-group's actual and ideal attributes experienced feelings of anger and agitation (Bizman et al., 2001; Petrocelli & E. R. Smith, 2005), as well as dejection (Bizman et al., 2001). In another study, Kessler and Hollbach (2005) asked East German students to recall a time when they felt happy (or angry) about their in-group. Participants' typical responses did not reference out-groups or inter-group contexts, but rather focused on the in-group's

own traits and actions (e.g., anger when in-group members confirmed negative stereotypes).

Other studies have operationalised group-based emotion about in-groups more indirectly, without explicitly assessing the emotions individuals feel as a group member. Thus, it is somewhat less clear that individuals are experiencing emotion as group-level subjects. For example, a number of studies have investigated individuals' feelings about their in-group's actions towards an out-group. In some of the earliest work on guilt at the group level, Doosje et al. (1998) presented individuals with evidence of their in-group's past mistreatment of an out-group and then asked how much they agreed or disagreed with statements such as "I feel regret about things my group did to [out-group] in the past." They described this kind of guilt and regret as collective, a term that is meant to reflect individuals' feelings based on their membership in a collective or group. This use of the term is potentially confusing, however, as collective emotions may also refer to feelings that are known to be shared collectively by group members (for a review, see Tiedens & Leach, 2004).

Whether it is called collective or group-based, a good deal of work presumes that individuals can feel group-based emotions about their in-group's actions in an inter-group relation even where their self-categorisation as a group member is implied rather than made explicit. For example, Iyer et al. (2003, Study 2) assessed European Americans' emotions with the statement "when I think about racial discrimination *by White people*, I feel ..." As participants had reported their ethnicity as "White/European American" in another part of the study, we presumed that participants' emotions were based in their membership in the in-group that was the agent of the discrimination. That individuals' feelings of guilt, responsibility, and blameworthiness were predicted by a belief that the group was responsible for racial discrimination supported our thinking. In this context, it is difficult to imagine people feeling guilty, responsible, and blameworthy for anything other than discrimination by an in-group within which they psychologically include themselves (for a discussion, see Leach et al., 2002).

Emotion about in-group circumstances. Research has also investigated group members' feelings about their in-group's circumstances. In one of the earliest investigations of group-based emotion, Bizman and Hoffman (1993, p. 144) asked participants to "think, *as an Israeli*, about the continuing Arab–Israeli conflict and to rate the degree to which this arouses in you, *as an Israeli*, each of the following emotions". More recently, a number of studies have assessed individuals' feelings of guilt (Iyer et al., 2003, Study 1; Leach et al., 2006; Powell et al., 2005; Schmitt, Behner, Montada, Muller, & Muller-Fohrbrodt, 2000; Swim & Miller, 1999) and anger (Leach et al., 2006) about their in-group's advantage over out-groups. In several of these

studies individuals endorsed the view that undeserved advantage accrues to all members of their in-group as a result of structural inequality. Thus, the guilt or anger that individuals expressed about their in-group's advantage seemed to be based on an inclusion of themselves in the advantaged in-group (see Leach et al., 2006, Study 2). However, this conclusion is hampered by the fact that in the context of well-known inter-group inequality, group advantage and disadvantage must be measured rather than manipulated. While the methods employed to assess emotion about in-group circumstances *may* make participants' in-group membership salient, they do not empirically demonstrate that emotion stems from participants' psychological inclusion in the group through self-categorisation.

Partly for this reason, in several studies Harth et al. (2008) first assessed individuals' identification with a real in-group and then presented them with (false) feedback that their in-group was (legitimately or illegitimately) advantaged over an out-group. When these highly identified individuals were led to believe that their in-group was *illegitimately* advantaged, they felt more guilty. When individuals were led to believe that their in-group was *legitimately* advantaged they felt more pride. This group-based pride predicted greater in-group favouritism and less willingness to help the out-group. Thus, emotion and action tendencies followed from the way in which the in-group's circumstance was framed. That individuals were highly identified with their in-group and that they experienced specific *self-conscious* emotions about the in-group's status position suggest that the emotions were group-based rather than personal.

From a different perspective, Yzerbyt, Gordijn, Dumont, and Wigboldus have conducted a series of experiments to demonstrate that observers of inter-group relations can experience emotional reactions "on behalf of" another group where they share a super-ordinate category membership with the victims. Dumont et al. (2003) provided Europeans with information about the September 11th attacks on the United States, and manipulated their shared categorisation by stating that the research was seeking responses either from "Europeans and Americans" or from "Europeans and Arabs". Results showed that participants felt more fearful about the attacks when they shared a super-ordinate category with Americans, compared to Arabs. Participants thus felt more emotional about a group's treatment and circumstances when they seemed to include themselves in a shared superordinate group.

4. Personal emotions directed at in-groups (in-group object, individual subject)

As with emotions directed at out-groups, it should be possible for individuals to experience emotions about an in-group, even as they are not

thinking of themselves as a group member. In this type of emotion a person is an individual subject who feels emotion about an in-group object. When emotions about the in-group have nothing to do with out-groups, they should not be associated with inter-group goals, action intentions, or behaviour. To our knowledge, no work has specified this type of group-level emotion, nor has it been directly investigated. Rather (as with reactions to out-groups), there is indirect evidence for this idea from research on *vicarious emotions* (e.g., Lickel et al., 2005).

This work shows that individuals feel emotions about an in-group even when they are not explicitly directed to self-categorise as a group member. More specifically, Lickel, Schmader, and colleagues argue that individuals can feel "vicarious emotions" about the actions of a person with whom they have a meaningful connection, such as an inter-personal relationship or shared in-group membership. For instance, Lickel et al. (2005) showed individuals to recall experiencing guilt and shame about the transgressions committed by fellow members of an ethnic group (see also Schmader & Lickel, 2006). Similarly, Johns, Schmader, and Lickel (2005) found individuals in the US to recall experiencing emotions such as shame, guilt, and anger about a member of their national in-group expressing prejudice towards Arabs after the September 11th terrorist attacks. However, these researchers make clear that this particular form of vicarious emotion operates primarily at the inter-personal or intra-group level. An in-group's relation to an out-group is not implied in such feelings and, thus, the emotions are not experienced as inter-group in nature.

5. Group-based emotions directed at individuals (individual object, in-group subject)

The last set of group-level emotions in our typology is directed at an individual object and experienced by an individual who self-categorises as a group member. Examples include British citizens' mourning after the death of Princess Diana, or Europeans' anger at the foreign policy decisions made by US President George W. Bush. To our knowledge, no theory or research has focused on such emotions, and thus the implications for inter-group relations are hard to foreshadow. We would expect, however, that when the individual target of the emotion clearly represents an out-group, then attitudes and actions towards the target would be generalised to his/her group and would have implications for inter-group relations. For example, Europeans' negative attitudes towards President Bush have resulted in more negative views towards the United States as a nation (see British Broadcasting Corporation, 2004).

Implications and future directions

Research has demonstrated that emotion operates in various ways at the group level. Emotion may be directed at an in-group, an out-group, or an inter-group context. It may or may not be based in shared group membership, and it may or may not have implications for inter-group relations. For the most part, the various terms used in the literature reflect these different levels of analysis. As a result, the parameters of each term tend to either partially overlap (e.g., inter-group emotion and group-based emotion) or remain fairly independent of each other (e.g., vicarious emotion and inter-group emotion). In addition, the various frameworks offer operationalisations of group-level emotion that are not necessarily consistent with the original definitions of the terms used. Taken together, these developments may make this area of research appear fragmented and incoherent. It is also possible that these divergences contribute to conceptual and methodological confusion that hinders further progress in the field.

To address these issues we have offered a typology to classify most of the various approaches to group-level emotion. Use of specific terminology to identify the subject and object of group-level emotions should more clearly indicate the level of analysis at which the emotion is believed to operate. This, in turn, should help clarify the conceptual specification of the emotion's antecedent appraisals and its potential implications for inter-group relations. A set of specific terms might also lead to more specific and consistent operationalisations of the construct across different studies. Finally, a common language will allow for an easier comparison and integration of research findings across the field.

Two key points should be highlighted regarding future directions. First, it is clear that research is rather uneven across the various types of group-level emotion. Considerably more work has examined (or purported to examine) group-level emotions experienced by individuals self-categorised as group members, compared to group-level emotions experienced by individuals acting as individuals. However, some current operationalisations of group-based emotions allow for the possibility that individuals—rather than group members—are feeling these emotions. Future work should directly investigate (1) whether individuals do in fact experience group-level emotions while not psychologically including themselves in a group; and (2) whether such emotional reactions to in-groups and out-groups do in fact have implications for inter-group relations.

Second, more work is needed to integrate different levels of analysis in studying emotion in inter-group relations. Research to date has typically investigated emotion either at the intra-group or inter-group level. However, it is quite possible that intra-group processes will impact individuals' experience and expression of group-based emotion, as well as the

implications of these emotions for inter-group relations. For instance, the extent to which a group develops consensus about its guilt for past wrong-doing (i.e., expresses a collective emotion) is likely to influence the extent to which group members are willing to express group-based guilt about these actions in an inter-group context. In-group consensus about the expression of guilt is also likely to influence group members' willingness to act on this emotion (e.g., Mackie et al., 2000; van Zomeren et al., 2004; for discussions see Parkinson et al., 2005; Tiedens & Leach, 2004). Future work should consider such questions by examining emotion in groups at multiple levels of analysis.

SELF-RELEVANCE AS A DETERMINANT OF GROUP-LEVEL EMOTION

We built on Parkinson et al.'s (2005) distinction between the subject and the object of emotion to conceptualise five broad types of group-level emotion. This framework integrates a range of work on emotion in inter-group relations. However, it does not address the degree to which these emotions are experienced. Thus, in this section we address the various ways that self-relevance has been conceptualised and studied as partly determining the strength of individuals' emotional responses about groups and inter-group relations.

Most appraisal theories of emotion posit that individuals do not feel emotions about every event or person that they encounter. Rather, only those stimuli that have some direct relevance to the self are thought to elicit emotional reactions (see Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Scherer et al., 2001). Thus, appraisal theories make the explicit assumption that people experience emotions when something important (e.g., a goal, an identity, esteem) is "at stake".

This perspective has been influential in models of emotion at the group level, which have also proposed that self-relevance is an important determinant of group-level emotion (see Leach et al., 2002; Mackie & E. R. Smith, 2002; E. R. Smith, 1993; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). However, self-relevance has been conceptualised and studied in divergent ways. For example, some work presumes that individuals must self-categorise as a member of a group if it, and the events that befall it, are to be self-relevant and thus elicit group-level emotion (see E. R. Smith, 1993; Parkinson et al. 2005; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). Simple categorical inclusion in an in-group is all that is deemed necessary to establish group-level self-relevance and thus group-level emotion.

Other work argues that a minimal level of identification with an in-group (i.e., the individual's psychological connection to an in-group) is *necessary* for individuals to experience emotion about the in-group and its relation to

out-groups (e.g., Mackie et al., 2004; E. R. Smith et al., 2007). This implies that simple inclusion in an in in-group category does not establish sufficient self-relevance to lead to group-level emotion. Other work suggests that a moderate or high degree of identification with an in-group most facilitates group-level emotion (see Doosje et al., 1998; Lickel et al., 2005; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Mathieu, Gordijn, & Wigboldus, 2006). This implies that neither simple self-categorisation nor minimal identification may establish sufficient self-relevance for individuals to feel emotion at the group level. To clarify these distinctions, in this section we review evidence for three indicators of self-relevance: domain relevance, psychological inclusion in a group (self-categorisation), and in-group identification.

Relevance of the domain

Few studies have examined indicators of self-relevance other than simple self-categorisation and in-group identification. However, one important indicator of self-relevance at both the individual (Lazarus, 1991) and group (Turner et al., 1987) levels is the degree to which a domain is relevant to the self and its goals. As far as we are aware, Leach et al. (2003) were the first to emphasise the role of domain relevance as a determinant of emotion in inter-group relations. In two studies of Dutch individuals' *schadenfreude* (i.e., satisfaction, happiness) at the failure of rival nationalities, Leach et al. (2003) assessed the degree to which participants expressed interest in a particular domain of inter-group competition (e.g., the football World Cup). Domain interest was assessed in a way typical of political interest, with the items, "I am interested in football", "I enjoy watching football on TV", and "I have regularly watched/listened to the World Cup". Importantly, Leach et al. showed domain interest to operate in a way that suggested it to be an indicator of the self-relevance of the inter-group relation. For example, interest in the domain of inter-group competition was moderately correlated with viewing the in-group as better than rival Germany in the domain ($r = .45$). In contrast, in-group identification was weakly correlated with this view ($r = .12$) despite its moderate correlation with domain interest ($r = .37$).

When there was little contextual reason to feel *schadenfreude* at Germany's failure in the domain, individuals' pre-existing interest in the domain was a moderate predictor of *schadenfreude* ($b = .42$, $SE = .08$, $p < .001$). This effect was obtained after accounting for the effects of in-group identification, dislike of the out-group, and other individual differences. Thus, when the social context did not make the inter-group competition self-relevant, the extent to which the domain of inter-group competition was personally relevant served as an important basis of schadenfreude. Based on Leach et al. (2003), Pennekamp, Doosje, Zebel, and Fischer (2007) have recently shown that the personal self-relevance of

inter-group relations is also an important predictor of anger about in-group disadvantage. They showed that Dutch students of Surinamese descent (Study 1) and Dutch women (Study 2) felt angrier about their in-group's societal disadvantage when they saw this disadvantage as relevant to their personal lives. However, it is important to note that this data was correlational; although the path model indicating this hypothesised order of association (self-relevance → anger) fits the data well, the reverse causal order (anger → self-relevance) is also likely.

Interestingly, Leach et al. (2003) argued that either a contextual manipulation of group-level self-relevance (e.g., in-group inferiority in the domain or some other threat) or the pre-existing self-relevance of the domain of inter-group competition can serve as a basis of emotion in inter-group relations. Indeed, when a manipulation established the in-group as inferior in the domain of inter-group competition, Multiple Regression analyses showed that individuals' interest in the domain was a less strong predictor of *schadenfreude* ($b = .17$, $SE = .08$, $p = .04$). This finding is shown in Figure 3. Thus, pre-existing individual differences in the self-relevance of the domain of inter-group competition were rendered less important when the context increased the self-relevance for all participants.

Self-categorisation

An extension of the self-relevance hypothesis to the group level suggests that individuals who are self-categorising as group members should have stronger emotional responses to self-relevant groups. Various approaches to emotion in inter-group relations have thus proposed that individuals



Figure 3. *Schadenfreude* regarding the German World Cup loss: Chronic threat × soccer interest manipulation (Leach et al., 2003, Study 1).

should feel stronger group-level emotion about the actions and circumstances of in-groups compared to out-groups (e.g., Branscombe, 2004; E. R. Smith, 1993). Although this hypothesis seems straightforward, empirical support is less prevalent than might be expected. This is because research has generally presumed, rather than manipulated or measured, individuals' self-categorisation as an in-group member when investigating group-level emotions.

In many instances, individuals' self-categorisation as an in-group member is presumed because these individuals have indicated that they belong to the relevant group in their response to general demographic questions (e.g., "what is your gender?"). This approach has been taken in studies of emotional responses to out-groups (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), as well as responses to an inter-group relation involving a group to which participants report belonging. For example, residents of a country have been asked to respond to their country's actions towards another country (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998, 2006; Iyer et al., 2007; Maitner et al., 2006, Study 3), and members of an ethnic group have been asked to respond to this group's relationship with another ethnic group (e.g., Iyer et al., 2003, Study 2; Roccas, Klar, & Leviatan, 2006; Swim & Miller, 1999). Still other studies ask individuals to compare the circumstances of their in-group to that of a relevant out-group (e.g., Iyer et al., 2003, Study 1; Leach et al. 2006, Studies 1 and 3; Powell et al., 2005, Study 1; Schmitt et al., 2001).

Although answers to demographic questions establish that participants generally view themselves as members of a given in-group, such questions cannot determine that individuals' emotions result from a particular instance of self-categorisation as a member of the in-group in the context under study. For example, although an individual may indicate that s/he is heterosexual when asked, this in-group may not be the self-categorisation in operation when asked about adoption rights for non-heterosexuals. Indeed, one's self-categorisation as religious or agnostic, or as politically right-wing or left-wing, may be more salient than one's sexuality when asked about non-heterosexuals' adoption rights.

Partly for this reason, Leach et al. (2006, Study 2) assessed the degree to which individuals psychologically included themselves in an in-group in the context of a particular inter-group relation. Thus, they assessed the degree to which population samples of non-Aboriginal Australians perceived themselves as belonging to this in-group when thinking about issues regarding Aborigines. As participants reported a moderate degree of this sort of self-categorisation while participating in a study regarding Aborigines, they seemed to have included themselves in their in-group when reporting feeling angry and guilty about non-Aborigines' advantage over Aborigines.

Several others studies have aimed to show more directly the role of self-categorisation in emotion in inter-group relations. Yzerbyt, Gordijn, Dumont, and Wigboldus have shown that even if people's in-group is not

directly implicated in an inter-group event, they may side with one of the groups who are involved, and thus experience the event from this group's perspective. In various contexts including the September 11th terrorist attacks (Dumont et al. 2003), disputes about university regulations (Gordijn et al., 2001; Yzerbyt et al., 2003), and disputes about university tuition (Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Dumont, 2006), participants were provided with information about a group victimised by another party. When participants were encouraged to categorise the victim group and their in-group as part of a super-ordinate group, they felt more anger (Gordijn et al., 2001; Yzerbyt et al., 2003) and more fear (Dumont et al., 2003), compared to a control condition where the victim was presented as a distinct out-group. In another study Yzerbyt et al. (2003) examined the role of self-categorisation in a super-ordinate category and level of identification with this category. Participants reported the greatest anger about the mistreatment of an out-group when (1) participants' in-group was part of a super-ordinate category that included the victimised out-group, and (2) participants were highly identified with this category. Using a similar paradigm, Gordijn et al. (2006) emphasised the similarities between participants' in-group and a victimised out-group (or the perpetrator). Participants who identified more with the super-ordinate category that included the victimised out-group felt more anger than those who were less identified.

Based on the above results, Yzerbyt et al. (2006) argued that self-categorisation is an important basis of emotion in inter-group contexts. They even go so far as to suggest that where individuals do not include an out-group in a super-ordinate category that includes the self, there may be insufficient self-relevance for emotion at the group level. This implies that self-categorisation as an in-group member is a form of group-level self-relevance *necessary* to group-level emotion (see also Branscombe, 2004; E. R. Smith, 1993). However, the studies reviewed above show that self-categorisation leads to small or moderate *increases* in the degree of group-level emotion. This indicates that individuals can feel emotion about out-groups, and suggests against viewing this form of self-relevance as necessary to group-level emotion.

Other research has examined the role of group-level self-categorisation by comparing emotion about in-group mistreatment to emotion about out-group mistreatment without relying on a super-ordinate categorisation (e.g., McCoy & Major, 2003, Study 2). For instance, van Zomeren et al. (2004, Study 1) led students to believe that either their own university (i.e., an in-group) or a neighbouring university (i.e., an out-group) were to be subjected to unfair fee increases. Although students reported greater anger at their in-group's mistreatment, anger at the mistreatment of the out-group was moderate in degree. In addition, participants reported a similar willingness

to protest the disadvantage, whether it was suffered by the in-group or the out-group. Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) results also provide some evidence that shared super-ordinate categorisation is not required for participants to feel angry about the out-group's disadvantage. Anger about in-group disadvantage was based in in-group concerns, such as the degree to which other in-group members appraised the situation in a similar way or were prepared to take action. In contrast, in-group concerns played little role in the anger about the out-group's disadvantage. This suggests that participants' anger at the out-group's disadvantage was determined by concern for the out-group's disadvantage, and not by concern for a super-ordinate category that included the in-group.

The studies reviewed above demonstrate that individuals are able to experience emotion about the events that befall an out-group. That emotion can be felt about a third-party's treatment of an out-group suggests that the self-relevance indicated by self-categorisation is not a necessary determinant of emotion in inter-group relations. Individuals can feel a variety of emotions about an out-group, and the events that befall it, without categorising themselves as part of a super-ordinate category that includes the out-group and the group-level self. Indeed, sympathy and anger at inter-group injustice does not require self-categorisation as an in-group member. This conclusion is consistent with appraisal models of emotion, which argue that self-relevance is not only determined by having one's identity at stake in a situation. The events that befall an out-group may be self-relevant because they are relevant to an individual's, or an in-group's, broader concern for values, ideologies, and cultural norms, such as morality or economic efficiency (see Lazarus, 1991; Leach et al., 2002).

Although it is not a necessary condition for group-level emotion, self-categorisation as an in-group member can *increase* the degree of group-level emotion because self-categorisation increases group-level self-relevance. However, it is important to note that objective evidence of a category membership, or even self-reported inclusion in a category, may not be sufficient to promote emotion about it. This may be why some researchers propose that subjective identification with an in-group is the indicator of group-level self-relevance that is the most important determinant of emotion in inter-group relations. We now turn to this issue.

Identification with an in-group

Research in the social identity tradition has demonstrated that individuals' level of in-group identification—or psychological connection to a group—can have important implications for perception and behaviour (for a review see Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002). Thus, it seems likely that in-group identification facilitates emotion in inter-group relations. More specifically,

identification should make the in-group more self-relevant and thus should increase the degree to which group and inter-group events lead to group-level emotions. Mackie et al. (2004, p. 231) have argued that the more identified one is with a group, the more "easily, frequently, and intensely" ones emotional responses to the group (and its relations to out-groups) should be generated. Various approaches to emotion in inter-group relations appear consistent with this view (see Doosje et al., 1998; Lickel et al., 2005; Yzerbyt et al., 2003).

In one study, Mackie et al. (2000, Study 1) asked participants to categorise themselves as belonging to one of two groups that held opposing opinions on a social issue—punishment of illegal drug use. Participants' level of identification with the in-group and the out-group was then measured with four items assessing feelings of closeness and similarity. Results showed that in-group identification was an independent predictor of anger towards the out-group, over and above the contribution of appraisals and self-categorisation. In another study, Mackie et al. (2004) found that US students who were more identified with their country reported more anger and fear about possible terrorist attacks in the future. And Petrocelli and E. R. Smith (2005, Study 2) demonstrated individuals' identification as American predicted greater agitation and anger emotions about the group failing to meet ideal and ought standards. However, it is important to note that a large number of studies have found individuals' identification with an in-group to have little direct association with emotion in inter-group relations (see below). This pattern has been most consistently demonstrated in studies of guilt, but has also been shown in work on other emotions such as anger, fear, and *schadenfreude*.

There is some dispute about whether group-critical emotions such as guilt should be positively or negatively associated with in-group identification. On the one hand increased identification should increase group-level self-relevance, but on the other hand increased identification may also increase motivation to maintain a positive image of the group (see Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). Troubling for either of these hypotheses is the fact that numerous studies have failed to find any direct link between in-group identification and guilt about in-group misdeeds (e.g., Branscombe, Slugoski, & Kappen, 2004; Gordijn et al., 2006; Johns et al., 2005; McGarty et al., 2005). For example, Iyer et al. (2003, Study 2) found that European Americans' level of identification with their in-group was not associated with guilt about the in-group's discrimination against African Americans. And, across several studies of various high-status in-groups in the US and Canada, Branscombe et al. (2004) found little association between in-group identification and general feelings of guilt about inequality or discrimination. In the three studies described earlier, Harth et al. (2008) failed to find in-group identification

to determine guilt about an experimentally created in-group advantage over an out-group. Indeed, even the most highly cited study of guilt in inter-group relations found no *direct* association between in-group identification and this emotion: Doosje et al. (1998, Study 2) found high identifiers to express more guilt than low identifiers only when their Dutch in-group was presented as committing "ambiguous" harm to Indonesians during colonisation.

Studies of other emotions in inter-group relations have also failed to find any direct association with in-group identification. For example, Mackie et al. (2000 Study 1) found no direct association between individuals' identification with an opinion-based in-group and fear of an opposed out-group. Similarly, two studies of *schadenfreude* at the failure of a rival out-group (Leach et al., 2003) found no association between this malicious pleasure and identification with the in-group. Research on group-based anger has also found no direct association between in-group identification and this emotion (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2004, in press; but see Mummendey et al., 1999). For example, Gordijn et al. (2006) found identification with one of two groups involved in a dispute over material resources to have no direct effect on anger about their treatment of each other. And, across three studies, no direct link was found between in-group identification and pride or sympathy about in-group advantages over out-groups (Harth et al., 2008).

Resolving the discrepancy

There is great inconsistency in the association between in-group identification and group-level emotions. This inconsistency is not confined to group-critical emotions (such as guilt and shame), but has also been shown in other emotions such as anger, fear, sympathy, and pride. Given that most studies have used reliable and valid measures of in-group identification with samples that are moderate to large in size, the lack of a consistent association does not appear to be a methodological artefact. Building on recent research findings, we offer five possible explanations for this discrepancy.

1. In-group identification as a distal indicator of self-relevance

As identification reflects a quite general connection to an in-group, it may be a relatively distal indicator of the self-relevance needed to elicit group-level emotions. As such, in-group identification may only serve as a basis of emotion in inter-group relations where identification is especially strong, salient, or clearly relevant to the emotion and the inter-group relation within

which it operates. However, when more proximal indicators of self-relevance are made salient or assessed, the distal nature of in-group identification may make it an unlikely basis of emotion in inter-group relations (Branscombe, 2004; Leach et al., 2003).

Some evidence for this view is suggested in work on group-level *schadenfreude* by Leach, Spears, and colleagues. In two studies of in-group members' *schadenfreude* at the failure of a rival out-group, Leach et al. (2003) assessed in-group identification as well as another indicator of self-relevance suggested by emotion theories (e.g., Lazarus, 1991): level of individuals' interest in the domain of inter-group competition. Results showed no association between *schadenfreude* and identification with the in-group. However, individuals' interest was a consistent predictor of *schadenfreude*, after accounting for in-group identification. Thus, Leach et al. (2003) suggested that interest in the domain of inter-group competition may serve as a more concrete indicator of individuals' psychological involvement in the inter-group relation, compared to the more general, abstract, and de-contextualised construct of in-group identification. Consistent with more general emotion theory (e.g., Lazarus, 1991), they argue that individuals' interest in, and appraisals of, this inter-group relation are the most important basis of emotions in inter-group relations. Identification with an in-group is likely to be only a distal indicator of self-relevance. Consistent with Leach et al.'s (2003) argument, other research has shown other indicators of self-relevance (e.g., Pennekamp et al., 2007) and more concrete appraisals of group and inter-group concerns (e.g., Harth et al., 2008; van Zomeren et al., 2004) to be stronger predictors of emotions in inter-group relations than in-group identification.

2. Indirect effects

A second explanation for the lack of association between identification and emotion is consistent with the idea that identification may be a distal indicator of group-level self-relevance: the effects of identification on emotion may operate through more proximal constructs. This was suggested in McGarty et al.'s (2005, Study 2) examination of non-indigenous Australians' guilt about their in-group's historical mistreatment of indigenous people during the colonisation of the country. Although Australian identification had no direct association with guilt, identification had a moderate association with doubts about whether group members could be held responsible for their ancestors' actions. These doubts, in turn, were moderately associated with less guilt about Australian colonisation. Thus, the association between in-group identification and guilt was fully mediated by a more proximal belief that was more strongly associated with

guilt. Without attention to this more proximal mediator, the association between in-group identification and guilt may not have been observed.

Roccas et al. (2006) recently showed a similar result in the context of Jewish Israeli guilt about their country's historical actions against Arabs. Participants' "glorification" of the in-group (including a sense of national superiority, submission to authority, and loyalty) had no direct association with their feelings of guilt. However, glorification had a moderate indirect association with guilt through beliefs that served to "exonerate" the in-group.

There is also evidence for the indirect effects of in-group identification on feelings of group-based pride. Maitner et al. (2006, Study 2) examined the association between US national identification (assessed in a separate pre-testing session) and satisfaction in response to a portrayal of their country's past of military aggression in Asia. They found that the identity subscale of collective self-esteem (tapping the importance of the group to identity) was a moderate predictor of justification of the in-group's misdeeds. This justification was moderately associated with the expression of satisfaction about the in-group's aggression. Maitner et al.'s (2006) results appear to mirror the findings that the negative association between in-group identification and guilt is mediated by justification and legitimisation.

3. Contextual moderation

A third reason why in-group identification has an inconsistent association with emotion in inter-group relations is that contextual features moderate this association. Thus, where these features are not taken into account, in-group identification may (appear to) have little association with emotions (see also van Zomeren et al., in press). Recent research has identified such contextual moderation primarily in investigations of group-critical emotions such as guilt and shame.

Doosje et al. (1998) argued that those who most strongly identify with an in-group are most motivated to maintain an image of their group as moral and good (for evidence, see Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007a). High identifiers may thus be especially keen to downplay the negative aspects of their in-group. As such, they may use defensive strategies to avoid experiencing group-critical emotions that may threaten the in-group's image. However, most studies demonstrate a negative relationship between in-group identification and group-critical emotions only in specific social contexts (e.g., Doojse et al., 1998, 2006; Johns et al., 2005; Zebel, Doojse, & Spears, 2004).

In-group identification appears to be negatively associated with group-critical emotions primarily when the in-group causes ambiguous or minimal harm to the out-group. When Doosje et al. (1998, Study 2) provided

participants with an ambiguous account of colonisation (i.e., with information about positive and negative Dutch acts), high identifiers reported *less* group-based guilt than low identifiers. Doosje et al. (1998) proposed that when group members have room to legitimate or downplay the in-group's wrong-doing, high identifiers are more likely to take advantage of this opportunity to maintain a positive image of their group (see also Branscombe et al., 1999).

A somewhat similar pattern was found in Johns et al.'s (2005) study of responses to contemporary transgressions by in-group members. They asked US citizens to recall instances of in-group members' prejudice towards Arabs after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Participants were also asked to judge how negative these events were. Among those who judged the instances of prejudice as less negative, their in-group identification (on all four subscales of Luhtanen & Crocker's, 1992, collective self-esteem scale) was associated with *less* shame. In other words, when an in-group member's prejudice was less severe and thus more easily legitimated, the more highly identified group members felt less ashamed about it. This is consistent with Doosje et al.'s (1998) argument that those who are highly identified with their in-group will avoid emotions that imply a criticism of the in-group when the context best allows. However, it is clear that more research is needed to corroborate and to clarify the role that ambiguity and severity of harm play in moderating the association between in-group identification and guilt in inter-group relations.

In contrast, cases of unambiguous or severe wrong-doing seem to force all group members to accept that their in-group is the agent of wrongdoing (Doosje et al., 1998). In such cases, high and low identifiers should feel equally guilty (and ashamed) about their in-group's actions. It is even possible that the most highly identified members will feel most strongly about the group's misdeeds when evidence of it is clear or the harm is severe.

Empirical evidence supports this view. Doojse et al.'s (1998, Study 2) research on Dutch students' guilt about their country's colonisation of Indonesia found no difference in the level of guilt expressed by high identifiers and low identifiers who were presented with a clearly negative account of colonisation. Other studies that have presented in-group members with clear and unambiguously negative evidence of their in-group's mistreatment of an out-group have also failed to find a direct association between in-group identification and guilt (e.g., Iyer et al., 2003, Study 2; McGarty et al., 2005, Study 2; Zebel et al., 2004). Similarly, Johns et al. (2005) did not find in-group identification and the negativity of the mistreatment of the out-group to interact to determine guilt (once shame was accounted for). Thus, even where participants judged an in-group member's prejudice as highly negative, in-group identification played no role in the level of guilt expressed.

4. Operationalisation of in-group identification

A fourth possible reason why in-group identification has inconsistent associations with emotion in inter-group relations is that identification has been operationalised in many different ways. Many studies (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998, 2006; Mackie et al., 2000; McGarty et al., 2005) have used an omnibus measure to assess individuals' general identification with an in-group, although each measure has included somewhat different items. Others have developed entirely different measures of identification (e.g., Roccas et al., 2006) or have used Luhtanen and Crocker's (1992) measure of collective self-esteem (e.g., Swim & Miller, 1999). This inconsistency in the operationalisation of in-group identification may account for some of the discrepant results reviewed earlier. Without an examination of how different measures of in-group identification are related to each other, it is difficult to know how diverging results may be reconciled.

Different studies also reflect various methodological and analytic approaches to the construct of in-group identification. Some researchers have treated general identification as a continuous predictor whereas others have treated it as a categorical predictor (dividing participants at the scale median or at particular points in the scale distribution). Future work would do well to be more sensitive to these concerns, as the choice to use categorical rather than continuous predictors is likely to influence the psychometric properties of the scale, as well as the interpretation of the results (see MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher, & Rucker, 2002). More generally, different measures of identification also tend to vary in their internal reliability. Future work might perhaps consider strategies to better account for measurement error.

5. Specificity of in-group identification

There may also be a theoretical explanation for the divergent patterns of association shown between in-group identification and emotion in inter-group relations. Research to date has generally not focused on the well-established fact that in-group identification is a multi-faceted construct best measured with multiple components (for a review, see Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004). As the components of in-group identification tap specific aspects of individuals' relations to an in-group, they are likely to have specific associations with emotion in inter-group relations. Work that conceptualises and measures in-group identification as a set of specific components, rather than as a single unitary construct, offers an important way forward in clarifying the inconsistencies in the literature.

Leach et al. (in press) recently proposed five specific components of in-group identification and offered a two-dimensional model within which

these are organised (see Figure 4). The first two components are *individual self-stereotyping* (i.e., self-perception as a prototypical group member) and *in-group homogeneity* (i.e., perceptions of the entire group as sharing commonalities). Together, these two components indicate individuals' self-definition—the degree to which individuals perceive themselves and the group as a whole as a collective entity that defines the self-concept of its members at the group level. The remaining three components indicate individuals' self-investment—the degree to which individuals invest themselves in the group-level self-definition. The components of self-investment include *satisfaction* with membership, *solidarity* (i.e., the psychological bond felt with fellow group members), and *centrality* (i.e., perceptions that the group is a central part of one's self-concept). In several studies, Leach et al. showed these five components of in-group identification to assess distinct aspects of individuals' psychological connection to an in-group in ways relevant to emotion in inter-group relations. For example, the individual self-stereotyping component of group-level self-definition was most associated with more depersonalisation and a greater degree of perceived overlap between the individual and the group. In contrast, the centrality components of group-level self-investment was most associated with perceived threat to the in-group whereas the satisfaction component was most associated with defending the in-group against such threat.

In one study focused on group-based guilt, Leach et al. (in press, Study 7) measured five components of European identification and then weeks later presented participants with clear and compelling evidence of Europe's mistreatment of Rwandan asylum seekers. Participants first read about the



Figure 4. Hierarchical (multi-component) model of in-group identification (Leach et al., in press). ISS = individual self-stereotyping, IGH = in-group homogeneity.

genocide in Rwanda and then read an ostensible Human Rights Watch report showing the European Union to contravene human rights law to deny asylum to deserving Rwandan families. Only the component of in-group identification that assessed the degree to which participants perceived themselves as a prototypical group member prospectively predicted greater guilt about the in-group's immoral treatment of an out-group ($r = .33$). This individual self-stereotyping component did not predict other, less relevant, group-based emotions like shame, sympathy, or feeling appalled ($r = |.01|$ to $|.20|$). Thus, as should be expected for other group-based emotions, it was individuals' psychological inclusion in the in-group that led to the emotion most relevant to this in-group.

Leach et al. (in press, Study 7) also found that components of in-group identification assessing satisfaction with ($r = .39$) and the centrality of ($r = .29$) the in-group predicted greater legitimisation of the in-group's actions (i.e., "Although mistakes may be made, there is nothing wrong with European asylum law", and "The European Union is right to handle asylum seekers from Rwanda in the way it does"). In line with the Doosje et al. (1998) argument reviewed earlier, and their findings regarding more general defence of the in-group against threat, Leach et al. suggest that it is those highest in group-level self-investment who should most defend their in-group against the threat posed by in-group immorality. Thus, higher group-level self-investment should predict lower group-based guilt. Where more general measures of in-group identification tap this group-level self-investment, they may be associated with legitimisation of the in-group's immorality and thus also be associated with less group-level guilt (e.g., McGarty et al., 2005, Study 2; Roccas et al., 2006, Study 1; see also Swim & Miller, 1999).

Implications and future directions

A good deal of theory and research on emotion in inter-group relations has presumed that self-categorisation and/or identification with an in-group is necessary, or especially important, to emotion at the group level. As a result, little attention has been paid to the more complicated issue of competing (or complementary) self-categorisations. Particularly in cases where an out-group is re-categorised as part of a super-ordinate category that also includes the in-group, the specific basis for individuals' emotional responses to an inter-group relation can be unclear. Within super-ordinate categories it is unclear if the emotion reflects categorisation at the super-ordinate level, the sub-ordinate in-group level, or the individual level. Future work should address these questions.

Despite the ambiguity in studies of super-ordinate categories, there is little evidence that the operation of emotion in inter-group relations *requires*

self-categorisation at the group level. Although, by definition, "inter-group emotion" requires an in-group subject and an out-group object of emotion, there are numerous other examples of group-level emotion at play in inter-group relations. We outlined four such examples in the typology offered in the first section of this paper. Although self-categorisation as an in-group member seems to increase the degree of emotion in inter-group relations, substantial emotion is observed where individuals (as individuals) attend to an out-group and/or its inter-group relations. Where other forms of self-relevance establish that individuals have some goal or aspect of themselves at stake, individuals may feel strong emotions about others' inter-group relations with no group-level self-categorisation. For example, an individual concern for human suffering, or individual empathy, may lead individuals to feel sympathy for refugees displaced by war in Africa, Asia, or the Middle East (see Batson et al., 1997).

The research reviewed above shows divergent patterns of association between in-group identification and emotion in inter-group relations. Some studies demonstrate a positive association between these two constructs, some demonstrate a negative relationship, and still others find no relationship between them. Empirical and theoretical work suggests five different explanations of this divergence: (1) in-group identification can be a distal predictor with (2) indirect effects on emotion in inter-group relations; (3) context moderates the association between in-group identification and emotion; (4) different operationalisations of general in-group identification have different effects; and (5) operationalising in-group identification as a general connection to an in-group has less precise effects than operationalising in-group identification in terms of more specific components. Future work should specify what aspect of in-group identification is expected to be associated with a given emotion and why (e.g., Leach et al., in press).

Understanding the role of self-categorisation and identification in emotion in inter-group relations may also be aided by greater attention to the distinctive effects that these and other indicators of group-level self-relevance may have (e.g., Leach et al., 2003). Although most work at present presumes that self-categorisation as an in-group member and identification with an in-group have similar associations with emotion in inter-group relations, this may not always be the case. Leach et al.'s (2003) findings suggest that contextual manipulations of self-relevance may weaken or altogether eliminate pre-existing individual differences in self-relevance. This raises the possibility that pre-existing individual differences in in-group identification may be less predictive of group-level emotion when self-categorisation as an in-group member is clearly established. Indeed, according to self-categorisation theory, a contextual feature that leads individuals to categorise themselves at the group level should promote

homogeneity within the group (Turner et al., 1987). Thus, where group-level self-categorisation is clear, pre-existing individual differences in in-group identification should be less important to the prediction of group-level emotion than the contextual self-categorisation that leads all individuals to be in-group, rather than individual, subjects. This is the likely explanation for why studies of group-level guilt (Harth et al., 2008; Iyer et al., 2003), sympathy (Harth et al., 2008; Iyer et al., 2003), *schadenfreude* (Leach et al., 2003), and anger (van Zomeren et al., 2004) that seem to first establish group-level self-categorisation tend to show little direct association between pre-existing in-group identification and emotion.

Of course, group-level self-categorisation and in-group identification may also have opposing effects on emotion in inter-group relations. For example, Leach et al. (in press, Study 7) showed that a common indicator of self-categorisation (i.e., individuals' self-stereotyping of themselves as similar to their in-group prototype) predicted guilt about in-group morality in a way opposite to a common indicator of in-group identification (i.e., individuals' satisfaction with their in-group membership). It is also important to allow for the possibility that the different indicators of self-relevance may have interactive effects. This was shown by Leach et al. (2003), who found domain relevance to have less of an effect on *schadenfreude* towards an out-group when the in-group was made to feel inferior in the domain of the out-group's failure. Thus, in-group identification was trumped by domain relevance, which was trumped by in-group domain inferiority. Attention to a wider range of indicators of self-relevance, and acknowledgement of their interactive effects, will help resolve current inconsistencies in the literature.

Finally, with a few exceptions, much of the research reviewed in this section has investigated negative emotions about inter-group relations (e.g., guilt, anger, shame). Relatively few studies have examined the association between in-group identification and positive emotions such as pride (but see Harth et al., 2008; Leach et al., 2007) and satisfaction (but see Leach et al., 2003; Maitner et al., 2006). This may be due to the fact that pride in, and satisfaction with, in-groups are often taken as indicators of in-group identification rather than as outcomes (for reviews see Ashmore et al., 2004; Leach et al., in press). Future research should expand the range of investigated emotions in inter-group relations to include more positive emotions.

CONCLUSIONS

Over the past 15 years, the study of inter-group relations has seen a renewed emphasis on the topic of emotion. Individuals' emotions about groups (and these groups' relationships to out-groups) have been investigated in various

contexts, from conflict and prejudice to contact and pro-social behaviour. This chapter has tried to identify and clarify points of convergence and divergence in the competing conceptualisations of emotion in inter-group relations. We focused on two issues fundamental to the conceptualisation of emotion in inter-group relations: terminology (and operationalisation), and the relationship between various indicators of self-relevance (e.g., self-categorisation and in-group identification) and emotions about groups or inter-group contexts.

This review shows how the divergence between current frameworks can produce conceptual confusion. What is the distinction between various terms such as vicarious, collective, and inter-group emotions? Is self-categorisation as an in-group member necessary to experience emotion about a group? Does identification with an in-group increase or decrease group members' emotions about groups? Given that different emotions have been investigated at different levels of analysis in different group and inter-group contexts, it is perhaps not surprising that the literature reflects a range of empirical findings and interpretations.

However, our reading of the literature suggests that there is room for reconciliation. Thus, we introduced a typology to classify the various approaches to emotion in inter-group relations along two dimensions: the (individual or in-group) subject of emotion, and the (individual, in-group, or out-group) object of emotion. The integration of most of the extant work into a typology suggests that the various terms and definitions offered for emotion in inter-group relations are complementary rather than contradictory. What is needed is greater attention to the particular subject and object of emotion in operation in inter-group relations. We will all be in a better position to understand how a particular idea or finding contributes to our general understanding if we have a broad framework within which the particular can be integrated.

More generally, our review highlights some new directions for theoretical and empirical work regarding the implications of individual-level processes for groups and inter-group relations. Simon (1997) pointed out that the collective self (where individuals psychologically include themselves in an in-group) has received far more conceptual and empirical attention in the study of inter-group relations than has the individual self. Ten years later this point still holds true, especially in approaches to emotion in inter-group relations. Future work needs to focus on precisely how and why individuals see themselves as implicated in the events that befall their in-group or out-groups. As suggested by the social identity tradition, an understanding of the relation between groups requires analysis of individuals' relations within groups. Greater attention to the multiple levels at which the self operates should enable much-needed examination of the interaction of the individual-level (subject or object) and group-level (object or subject) processes at work

in emotion in inter-group relations. Perhaps a better understanding of what people feel at the individual and group levels will help us better determine what they are likely to do (at the individual and group levels). This is the hope of work examining emotion in inter-group relations.

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