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Moral Exclusion and Injustice: An Introduction

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Moral exclusion occurs when individuals or groups are perceived as outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply. Those who are morally excluded are perceived as nonentities, expendable, or undeserving. Consequently, harming or exploiting them appears to be appropriate, acceptable, or just. This broad definition encompasses both severe and mild forms of moral exclusion, from genocide to discrimination. The paper discusses the antecedents and symptoms of moral exclusion, and the interaction between the psychological and social factors that foster its development. Empirical research on moral exclusion is needed to pinpoint its causes, to predict its progression, and to effect change in social issues that involve the removal of victims from our moral communities. The last section of the paper introduces the articles that follow.

Moral exclusion occurs when individuals or groups are perceived as *outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply.* Those who are morally excluded are perceived as nonentities, expendable, or undeserving; consequently, harming them appears acceptable, appropriate, or just. Moral exclusion (a term proposed by Ervin Staub, 1987) links a wide range of social issues, such as abortion, species conservation, nuclear weapons, and immigration policies, because our position on these issues depends on whom we include in or exclude from our moral boundaries.

This paper introduces the journal issue with an overview of themes examined in the papers that follow. It is organized according to the progression of

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moral exclusion, from antecedents to occurrence and outcomes; and it describes the interaction between the psychological and social factors that foster moral exclusion.

Background

Moral exclusion can be mild or severe. Severe instances include violations of human rights, political repression, religious inquisitions, slavery, and genocide. The person or group excluded ("the other") is perceived as a plague or threat, and harm doing can take such extreme forms as torture and death. Milder instances of moral exclusion occur when we fail to recognize and deal with undeserved suffering and deprivation. The other is perceived as nonexistent or as a nonentity. In this case, harm doing results from unconcern or unawareness of others' needs or entitlements to basic resources, such as housing, health services, respect, and fair treatment. Although harms that result from unconcern or from efforts to achieve one's own goals may not involve malevolent intent, they can nevertheless result in exploitation, disruption of crucial services, suffering, the destruction of communities, and death. Outwardly, severe and mild forms of moral exclusion are different, but they share vital underlying characteristics. In both, the perpetrators perceive others as psychologically distant, lack constructive moral obligations toward others, view others as expendable and undeserving, and deny others' rights, dignity, and autonomy.

Although moral exclusion often underlies people's decisions and behavior, it has received surprisingly little direct or systematic attention in the psychological literature. Diverse areas of psychology are relevant to moral exclusion, including altruism, aggression, prejudice, discrimination, stigma, conflict, cooperation and competition, obedience to authority, justice, and victimization. These and other areas offer important insights, but work that directly investigates moral exclusion is scant.

The psychology of justice is concerned with people's beliefs about fairness and entitlement, both for issues of process ("procedural justice"; see Lind & Tyler, 1988) and for issues of resource distribution ("distributive justice"; see Deutsch, 1985). It should have particular relevance to moral exclusion. That body of research, however, examines the forms that justice takes, not whether it is relevant at all. The justice literature explicitly or implicitly assumes moral inclusion (described in more detail in the next section) in the kinds of relationships it considers. "Moral inclusion" refers to relationships in which the parties are approximately equal, the potential for reciprocity exists, and both parties are entitled to fair processes and some share of community resources. When these conditions are not met—as they are not in unequal relationships between those who are advantaged and disadvantaged—the justice literature is less relevant. With few exceptions, notably Deutsch (1974, 1975, 1985), Staub

(1985, 1987), and the literature on victimization, the justice implications of relations with those beyond one's moral boundary have been largely neglected. Although the victimization literature predominantly focuses on victims rather than victimizers, it has provided important insights into some symptoms of moral exclusion, particularly the belief in a just world, victim derogation, and victim blaming (see Austin & Hatfield, 1980; Lerner, 1970, 1980; Walster & Walster, 1975).

Expanding justice research to the topic of moral exclusion is consistent with the direction that the psychological literature on justice is apparently taking. Originally focused on social exchange (Homans, 1961) and concerns with equity (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978), justice theorizing has become more complex, multifaceted, and attuned to situational nuances (Mikula, 1980). Justice theorists have specified various rules for fair resource distribution (Deutsch, 1975, 1985) and have specified how particular procedures influence our perceptions of fairness for these distributions (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). The justice literature would be more complex and applicable to yet wider social contexts if moral inclusion were not assumed, but instead was the subject of empirical scrutiny (see Tyler & Lind, this issue).

In fact, this may be the direction that work on justice is taking. In the past few years, there has been a surge of writing that specifically examines social and psychological factors that abet harm doing (e.g., Bandura, 1986, 1990; Bar-Tal, 1989; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Lifton, 1986; Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Staub, 1989). These works vary considerably in their focus (e.g., social cognition, prejudice, prosocial behavior, obedience to authority) and are not all perceived as part of the justice literature; however, they indicate a growing interest in moral exclusion and its outcomes. These new works contribute to an increasingly cohesive psychology of harm and injustice, a literature that has direct relevance for moral exclusion. The next sections and the papers that follow describe a wide range of psychological research that pertains to moral exclusion.

Antecedents of Moral Exclusion

Conceptual Origins of Moral Exclusion: The Scope of Justice

Although we rarely think about them, we each have beliefs about the sorts of beings that should be treated justly. Moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply only to those within this boundary for fairness, called our "scope of justice" or "moral community." Membership within this boundary, therefore, has profound implications. People who are slaves, children, women, aged, Black, Jewish, mentally retarded, physically handicapped, and insane constitute a partial list of beings whose rights have been abrogated or eliminated because of their exclusion from the scope of justice.

Deutsch (1974, 1985) defines the scope of justice as the psychological boundary of one's moral community; a narrow conception of community results in a constricted scope of situations in which considerations of justice govern one's conduct. Walzer (1983) asserts that distributive justice begins with allocation of membership in the community; denial of membership results in the tyranny of insiders over outsiders, and begins "the first of a long train of abuses" (p. 62). Therefore, the extent of our moral community is fundamental to the psychology of justice.

People who morally exclude others are often viewed as evil or demented, but we each have boundaries for justice and can morally exclude others in some spheres of our lives. Typically, we feel strong moral obligations to family and friends, but not to strangers, enemies, or members of disadvantaged groups, so we are more likely to exclude them from our moral universe. As papers in this issue repeatedly assert, adverse social circumstances create the conditions necessary for ordinary people to dehumanize, harm, and act with incredible cruelty toward others.

What then, in concrete terms, is moral inclusion? An empirical study of the scope of justice approached this question by using principal components analysis of attitudes and behaviors (Opotow, 1987). The findings indicated a coherent cluster of attitudes that comprised moral inclusion: (1) believing that considerations of fairness apply to another, (2) willingness to allocate a share of community resources to another, and (3) willingness to make sacrifices to foster another's well-being. This definition is consistent with Regan's (1983) proposition that members of the moral community are those whose well-being concerns us, and with Fineberg's (1986) assertion that those with rights (i.e., members of the moral community) exercise them not only through asserting claims, but also through surrendering these rights to others. Although useful in its present form, this definition would benefit from additional empirical examination to assure its reliability and accuracy.

As a conceptual convenience, the scope of justice is often described as dichotomous—a person is either inside or outside. The extent of people's scope of justice can vary, however, depending on numerous factors, such as the social value of goods at stake (Foa & Foa, 1974; Walzer, 1983), individual ethical beliefs, and ideas about fairness embedded in our culture. Recent investigation of moral boundaries in adolescents' peer conflicts (Opotow, 1989) provides support for the idea that moral inclusion is a continuous variable that can be conditional in nature. Qualitative data indicated that not all subjects definitively include or exclude an opponent based on the three indicators mentioned above. For instance, some subjects were willing to see an opponent experience unfair treatment and would refuse to lend an opponent money (i.e., allocate a concrete resource), but would help an opponent in some situations. This suggests, first, that the three indicators do not always occur as a cluster; second, when they do not, moral inclusion is unstable or provisional; third, there may be a consistent

ranking for the three indicators that can roughly calibrate degree of moral inclusion.

Although the scope of justice is largely ignored in psychology, it is debated among moral philosophers. Nozick (1974) and Rawls (1971) assert that membership in the human species is the appropriate boundary. This psychologically salient boundary is widely accepted by philosophers, psychologists, and the lay public, but recently it has become less distinct and more controversial. Advances in fetal medicine have raised questions about when one becomes a member of the category "human," with its attendant rights (Callahan & Callahan, 1984). Regan (1983) and Singer (1975) argue that cognitive awareness, rather than species membership, is a more just boundary; therefore, nonhuman sentient animals such as higher mammals are entitled to their lives and to fair treatment. This view is gaining increasing acceptance as research reveals that nonhuman animals have more sophisticated intellectual capacities than previously suspected (see Hoage & Goldman, 1986). More extensive boundaries are proposed by Schweitzer and the Jainists, who argue that all forms of life should be treated with reverence. Stone (1974) and Leopold (1949) argue for still wider boundaries that include inanimate natural objects. This view "enlarge[s] the boundaries of the community to include soils, water, plants, and animals, or collectively, the land" (Leopold, 1949, p. 204). Until recently, this view was considered radical; it is gaining increased public acceptance (e.g., Bryant, 1989) as our moral boundaries expand.

In addition to differences between philosophical positions, the boundaries of the moral community also vary between cultures and historical periods. To some extent, we each construct our own moral code, but prevailing cultural norms also shape our beliefs about which categories of beings are entitled to considerations of fairness (Bandura, 1986; Edwards, 1987; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987). As an example on a current moral frontier, many North Americans are outraged when Japanese fishermen slaughter whales and porpoises, which are now included in our moral community but not in theirs. Yet, relatively recently, whaling was a major industry in the U.S.A. Similarly, although the slaughtering of farm animals is not widely viewed as an injustice in Western countries, it is ethically repugnant in other traditions such as in Buddhism. As Austin and Hatfield state,

> It is easy for us to feel appalled at the way nobles exploited their serfs, plantation owners exploited their slaves, and male chauvinists exploited women. But were these landowners, slaveowners, and male chauvinists fundamentally different from us, or were they simply responding to different pressures and a different *status quo?* The prevailing power balances, then, seem to affect even the most aloof reformers' conceptions of social justice. (1980, p. 43)

To summarize, one's scope of justice is largely determined by the prevailing social order, which defines both our relationships with others and our beliefs

about their entitlements. The Nazi term, *lebensunwerten Lebens* ("life unworthy of life"), highlighted the fact that their prevailing social order had identified groups they deemed unworthy of living. Although this example is extreme and pathological, all societies implicitly or explicitly identify deserving and undeserving groups.

Psychological Origins of Moral Exclusion

Apart from the moral fashions of the moment, are there enduring psychological factors that predict moral exclusion? Although we lack a cohesive literature on moral exclusion, research in a number of related areas suggests that two factors modify our moral boundaries. The first, severity of conflict, results from our perceptions of situations. The second, feelings of unconnectedness, results from our perceptions of relationships.

Conflict. Justice during conflict is different than during times of calm. Danger, conflict, and stress reinforce group boundaries and change information processing strategies and the choice of justice rules (Coser, 1956; Leventhal, 1979; Staub, 1985). As conflict escalates, cohesion within groups increases, but concern for fairness between groups shrinks. Because moral constraints on behavior are weak for those outside the scope of justice, outsiders are increasingly endangered. Dominance can take extreme forms, such as exploitation, slavery, and extermination (Lerner & Whitehead, 1980).

Consistent with work on conflict and ethnocentrism (Bar-Tal, this issue; Brewer, 1979; LeVine & Campbell, 1972), and work on "enemy images" (Holt & Silverstein, 1989; White, 1984), those within the community perceive their own group as more moral, honest, peaceful, virtuous, and obedient than outgroup members. The outgroup's perceived moral failings justify utilitarian, self-maximizing decisions that dispense with concerns about their well-being. Consequently, conflict with those within the moral community takes a different form than conflict with those outside it. With those inside, conflict is the regulated competition of equals, conducted according to rules of fair play, such as a duel or a bidding war; with those outside, conflict is an unregulated, no-holds-barred power struggle among unequals, such as guerrilla warfare (Deutsch, 1985).

The body of work on conflict predicts a simple negative relationship between severity of conflict and the scope of justice. Opotow (1987) found that increasing conflict constricted subjects' scope of justice. Less is known about decreasing the severity of conflict. Hallie (1971) suggested that diminished conflict offers an opportunity to enlarge moral boundaries:

> The justifications the victimizers believe in usually crumble only after the victimizer has been put into some kind of danger, has been coerced. When one's self-interest is at issue, guilt, if it comes at all, frequently follows danger . . . . After Abolition many planters

> piously asserted their long-standing conviction that the slaves should be freed, and many Nazis stated stoutly, after the unconditional surrender, that they always thought destroying Jews was unnecessary or even wrong. Unfortunately for our species, victimizers need to experience contradiction in the form of coercion and moral guilt. (p. 260)

Empirical investigation of the effects of decreased conflict on moral boundaries could advance theory and have practical relevance to deterrence of moral exclusion.

Unconnectedness. Moral exclusion emerges from our innate tendency to differentiate objects (Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). Differentiation and categorization can often be innocuous, merely facilitating acquisition of information and memory. Social categorization becomes invidious when it serves as a moral rationalization for injustice. Race, for example, could be a neutral characteristic; as a criterion for social categorization, however, it becomes a value-loaded label that generates unequal treatment and consequences for members of different groups (Archer, 1985; Tajfel, 1978).

Perceiving another as unconnected to oneself can trigger negative attitudes, destructive competition (Deutsch, 1973), discriminatory responses (Tajfel, 1978), and aggressive, destructive behavior (Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975)—attitudes and behaviors consistent with moral exclusion. Conversely, perceiving another as connected to oneself in any way can hinder moral exclusion. Belonging to the same community, perceiving another as a worthwhile being, or discerning any thread of connectedness creates bonds, even with strangers. Research on cooperation and competition (Deutsch, 1973), prosocial behavior (Staub, 1978), interpersonal attraction (Byrne, 1971), ethnocentrism (Brewer, 1979; LeVine & Campbell, 1972), and value similarity (Schwartz & Struch, 1989) supports the idea that connection leads to attraction, empathy, and helpful behavior—attitudes and behavior consistent with moral inclusion.

From the above research, it would seem that perceiving another as beneficial or as similar should exert roughly comparable effects on measures of moral inclusion. However, an empirical examination of the scope of justice did not support this hypothesis (Opotow, 1987). In an experiment that examined how moral boundaries were modified by severity of conflict, perceiving another as similar or dissimilar ("similarity"), and perceiving another as beneficial or harmful ("utility"), the findings indicated that conflict and utility were significant and consistent predictors of moral inclusion, but similarity was not. An isolated finding, an interaction between conflict and similarity, suggested that moral inclusion based on similarity is highly reactive to severity of conflict. This finding contradicted common wisdom and research that predicts similarity should foster moral inclusion. Here, similarity increased moral *exclusion* as conflict escalated. These data question the assumption that all variables that engender connectedness will lead to moral inclusion in a similar fashion; instead,

they suggest that each type of connectedness has a distinctive phenomenological path to moral inclusion. Therefore, although psychological research in areas closely related to moral exclusion can offer insight, only direct investigation can provide accurate, useful data on the nature and progression of moral exclusion.

The Occurrence of Moral Exclusion

In *The Devil's Dictionary,* Ambrose Bierce (1906/1978) defines *moral* as "Conforming to a local and mutable standard of right. Having the quality of general expediency" (p. 169). This ironic definition has the ring of truth. We prefer to think of our ethical ideals as stable and unwavering, but in reality they are more reactive to situations than we notice. Social success depends upon knowing which moral rules are appropriate for different kinds of relationships. Therefore, we unconsciously choose from our repertory of moral responses, depending on salient characteristics of each situation (Staub, this issue). Stage theorists of moral development (e.g., Kohlberg, 1976) assume that moral reasoning is stable at each stage, but Bandura (1986) questions this assumption, stating "the standards for moral reasoning are much more amenable to social influence than stage theories would lead one to expect" (p. 493).

Moral flexibility has both assets and liabilities. Those who can conceive of alternative definitions of a situation and its requirements can break away from the unquestioning conformity to orders and norms that permits people to carry out crimes of obedience (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989). Moral flexibility may also have some of the assets of cognitive flexibility. In negotiation (Pruitt, 1981) and conflict resolution (Deutsch, 1973), recognizing alternatives can fortify one's negotiating stance and generate integrative solutions. In social relations, recognizing moral alternatives may strengthen social influence; however, it can have the dangerous by-product of a "double standard." For example, in instances of sexism and racism, what constitutes "fair" behavior differs, based on group membership. An extreme and odious example of moral flexibility was "doubling," in which Nazi doctors created an "ordinary self" (healer) and an "Auschwitz self" to avoid the conscious awareness that they were killers (Lifton, 1986). For Auschwitz doctors, some people remained patients who should be healed; others, simultaneously excluded from the categories of "medical patient" and "human," were removed from the doctors' moral community and from medicine's ethical obligations. In moral flexibility, doubling, and the double standard, splitting one's moral obligations results in decent behavior for those in one's moral community but harm for those outside.

Moral exclusion not only relies on moral flexibility, but also on the appearance of moral legitimacy. Moral reasoning in the service of moral exclusion is typically self-serving, utilizes trivial criteria to justify harm, and implicitly asserts that particular moral boundaries are correct. For example, the professed

goal of "protecting the purity of one's community" designates moral boundaries with unflattering contrasts and implicit devaluation. It is difficult to find moral values that do not imply moral boundaries. Even higher values, such as enhancing human dignity, imply that there is a moral boundary that excludes other species of animals.

Excusing harm doing with arguments that justify implicit moral boundaries is common. For example, minorities are often excluded when they seek to rent or buy a residence. Community members rationalize their exclusionary practices with negative characterological attributions about outgroup members that provide a false moral justification for discrimination. Harmful outcomes accrue to minority group members, who experience prejudice and reduced mobility (Danielson, 1976). These moral justifications for harm also injure the perpetrators and those they ostensibly protect by shielding them from an opportunity to conquer their fear of those who differ from them on some characteristic, and by losing an opportunity to enlarge and enrich their restricted subculture (see Fine, this issue).

Symptoms of Moral Exclusion

The rationalizations and justifications that support moral exclusion render it difficult to detect. Therefore, it is important to be able to recognize its characteristic symptoms, and this ability may also offer opportunities to arrest its advance. There is a literature on sanctioned harm doing that, although neither large nor cohesive, can provide insight into the symptoms of moral exclusion. In analyses of mass murders and genocides, particularly the Holocaust and the My Lai massacre (e.g., Arendt, 1963; Bandura, 1990; Bar-Tal, 1989; Duster, 1971; Kelman, 1973; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Lifton, 1973, 1986; Sanford & Comstock, 1971; Smelzer, 1971; Staub, 1987, 1989; Thompson & Quets, 1987), the authors highlight different symptoms, but there is much overlap (for detailed descriptions, see Bandura, this issue; Lifton, 1986; Staub, this issue).

To create a codebook of symptoms that would define moral exclusion operationally for empirical research, I distilled a list of more than two dozen symptoms from this literature on sanctioned harm doing (see Table 1). Not all the symptoms have equal importance, the list is not exhaustive, and it is merely a list, not a description of how the symptoms cluster. For example, scapegoating, an ordinary form of moral exclusion for children, can include blaming the victim, fear of contamination, derogation, deindividuation, moral engulfment, condescension, and other processes. Yet the list is useful to recognize and study moral exclusion.

Considered as a group, these symptoms can be categorized in several ways. They are *exclusion-specific* and unlikely to be employed in common interpersonal relations, or they are *ordinary* and frequently occur in everyday life. I describe

Table 1. Processes of Moral Exclusion

Process	Manifestation in moral exclusion
Exclusion-specific processes	
Biased evaluation of groups	Making unflattering comparisons between one's own group and another group; believing in the superiority of one's own group
Derogation	Disparaging and denigrating others by regarding them as lower life forms or inferior beings—e.g., barbarians, vermin
Dehumanization	Repudiating others' humanity, dignity, ability to feel, and entitlement to compassion
Fear of contamination	Perceiving contact with others as posing a threat to one's own well-being
Expanding the target	Redefining "legitimate victims" as a larger category
Accelerating the pace of harm doing	Engaging in increasingly destructive and abhorrent acts to reduce remorse and inhibitions against inflicting harm
Open approval of destructive behavior	Accepting a moral code that condones harm doing
Reducing moral standards	Perceiving one's harmful behavior as proper; replacing moral standards that restrain harm with less stringent standards that condone or praise harm doing
Blaming the victim	Displacing the blame for reprehensible actions on those who are harmed
Self-righteous comparisons	Lauding or justifying harmful acts by contrasting them with morally condemnable atrocities committed by the adversary
Desecration	Harming others to demonstrate contempt for them, particularly symbolic or gratuitous harm
Ordinary processes	
Groupthink	Striving for group unanimity by maintaining isolation from dissenting opinion that would challenge the assumptions, distortions, or decisions of the group
Transcendent ideologies	Experiencing oneself or one's group as exalted, extraordinary, and possessed of a higher wisdom, which permits even harmful behavior as necessary to bring a better world into being
Deindividuation	Feeling anonymous in a group setting, thus weakening one's capacity to behave in accordance with personal standards
Moral engulfment	Replacing one's own ethical standards with those of the group
Psychological distance	Ceasing to feel the presence of others; perceiving others as objects or as nonexistent
Condescension	Regarding others as inferior; patronizing others, and perceiving them with disdain—e.g., they are childlike, irrational, simple
Technical orientation	Focusing on efficient means while ignoring outcomes; routinizing harm doing by transforming it into mechanical steps

(*continued*)

Table 1. (*Continued*)

Process	Manifestation in moral exclusion
Double standards	Having different sets of moral rules and obligations for different categories of people
Unflattering comparisons	Using unflattering contrasts to bolster one's superiority over others
Euphemisms	Masking, sanitizing, and conferring respectability on reprehensible behavior by using palliative terms that misrepresent cruelty and harm
Displacing responsibility	Behaving in ways one would normally repudiate because a higher authority explicity or implicitly assumes responsibility for the consequences
Diffusing responsibility	Fragmenting the implementation of harmful tasks through collective action
Concealing the effects of harmful behavior	Disregarding, ignoring, disbelieving, distorting, or minimizing injurious outcomes to others
Glorifying violence	Viewing violence as a sublime activity and a legitimate form of human expression
Normalizing violence	Accepting violent behavior as ordinary because of repeated exposure to it and societal acceptance of it
Temporal containment of harm doing	Perceiving one's injurious behavior as an isolated event—"just this time"

this distinction in more detail in the next paragraphs. In addition, at least four other dimensions on which the symptoms can be categorized are interesting to consider: (1) They are predominantly *cognitive,* i.e., categorizations of people and social situations based on beliefs and expectations, or they are predominantly *moral,* i.e., based on rules of conduct concerning the mutual obligations, rights, and entitlements of those in relationships. (2) They are largely *individual* symptoms, or they are *group* symptoms. (3) They are mere *symptoms* of moral exclusion, or they actively *advance* it. This distinction, an important one for understanding the progression of moral exclusion, is not readily apparent and could be clarified by systematic study. (4) They *eliminate self-deterrents,* they *promote self-approval,* or like moral justifications, they are especially powerful because they *do both* (Bandura, this issue). Discovering stable clusters of these symptoms would contribute coherence to the literature on sanctioned harm, and provide useful categories for theorists and researchers. Bandura's model (this issue) includes many of these symptoms and identifies four categories that group them.

Nearly half the symptoms are exclusion-specific. Examples are dehumanization, fearing contamination from social contact, and reducing one's moral standards. Although these symptoms can occur in everyday relations, they signal that interpersonal or intergroup conflict is taking a destructive course. In

his Crude Law of Social Relations, Deutsch (1973) states that the "characteristic processes and effects elicited by a given type of social relationship tend also to elicit that type of relationship" (p. 365). This law applies particularly well to these potent symptoms, in which there is likely to be a reciprocal relation between symptoms and effects. In other words, symptoms that provoke moral exclusion are also triggered by moral exclusion, instigating a vicious cycle. Concrete actions that obstruct the exclusion-specific symptoms may also arrest moral exclusion. It is possible that there may be certain critical symptoms to halt, particularly if they occur in a relatively invariant pattern. However, lacking systematic empirical studies, we still have much to learn about the course that moral exclusion takes.

Ordinary symptoms associated with moral exclusion can occur in everyday life. Examples are psychological distancing, displacing responsibility, group loyalty, and normalizing and glorifying violence. These symptoms can be part of the work routine in certain societal institutions, for example, normalizing violence in the military, transcendent ideologies in religious establishments, technical thinking in business organizations, displacement of responsibility by nurses in hospitals, and psychological distancing by doctors. These and numerous other institutions routinely employ euphemisms to discuss unpleasant topics. Although these ordinary exclusion symptoms can occur without people necessarily perceiving others as outside the moral community, their ordinariness poses a special risk; those who habitually employ them can perceive some people as objects and imperceptibly cross a threshold that excludes these others from their moral universe.

Interaction of Psychological and Social Factors

As the symptoms indicate, both social and individual elements contribute to moral exclusion. Moral exclusion emerges and gains momentum in a recursive cycle in which individuals and society modify each other. In one direction, individuals internalize the prevailing social order, reshape their perceptions of others, reconfigure their moral community, and engage in symptoms of moral exclusion such as dehumanization, victim blaming, psychological distancing, and condescension. In the other direction, moral exclusion emerges from individuals; their attitudes and behaviors reshape the social order, redefining group entitlements, narrowing the scope of justice, and reinforcing the perceptual distortions that gave rise to them. The interaction between individuals and society is evident even when isolated, psychopathic subgroups or individuals attack people (as in the 1989 murder of "feminists" in Montreal). They are, to some extent, acting on societal norms that condone some forms of mistreatment, such as devaluation of women. In these tragic attacks, perpetrators employ elaborate and obviously flawed moral justifications to support their distorted contention that they are rooting out an evil.

Such individual rationalizations, although outrageous, are not very different from the reasons given to defend state-supported harm that occurs in violations of human rights. Both covert and overt institutionalization of moral exclusion, such as racism and apartheid, are far more virulent and dangerous than the individual manifestation because institutionalized harm occurs on a much larger scale. Yet moral exclusion can engender widespread harm within a society only when people *individually* engage in moral restructuring. The bidirectional influence between individuals and society in perpetuating moral exclusion suggests possible ways to interrupt the cycle of harm.

Outcomes of Moral Exclusion

Those who are morally excluded are perceived as undeserving, expendable, and therefore eligible for harm. Although both those inside and outside the moral community can experience wrongful harm, harm inflicted on insiders is more readily perceived as an injustice and activates guilt, remorse, outrage, demands for reparative response, self-blame, or contrition. When harm is inflicted on outsiders, it may not be perceived as a violation of their rights, and it can fail to engage bystanders' moral concern.

As severity of conflict and threat escalates, harm and sanctioned aggression become more likely. As harm doing escalates, societal structures change, the scope of justice shrinks, and the boundaries of harm doing expand. Because conflict with unequals is an unregulated, no-holds-barred power struggle (Deutsch, 1985) and because moral constraints on behavior are weak for those outside the scope of justice, outsiders are increasingly endangered (Lerner & Whitehead, 1980). The papers that follow more closely examine the relationship between moral exclusion and its outcomes—both to its victims and to its perpetrators—and give many examples of how moral exclusion can lead to insidious and extreme forms of harm.

Conclusion

Moral exclusion can occur in degrees, from overt evil to passive unconcern. By framing moral exclusion broadly, we can examine social and psychological influences on moral exclusion and gain insight into its emergence and progression. In this broad conceptualization, moral exclusion is neither an isolated nor inexplicable event, but occurs with great frequency, depends on ordinary social and psychological processes to license previously unacceptable attitudes and behavior, and can cause great harm, from personal suffering to widespread atrocities. Although numerous areas of psychology are relevant to it, moral exclusion has largely eluded direct scrutiny: "It is the principled resort to destructiveness that is of greatest social concern, but ironically it is the most ignored in psychological analyses of inhumanities" (Bandura, this issue, p. 43).

This overview of moral exclusion highlights the need for empirical research. Experimental work, largely lacking, could provide precise and reliable measures of moral inclusion and exclusion, identify factors that modify moral boundaries, examine the effects of diminished conflict on the scope of justice, detect relationships among the symptoms associated with moral exclusion, and examine the relationship between these symptoms and the progression of harm doing.

In addition to advancing empirical and theoretical knowledge, research on moral exclusion has the potential to extend social justice. Because social researchers take an analytical rather than a polemical approach to social issues, they can identify and expose social ideologies that support injustice. In doing so, they can actively precipitate social change.

The Present Issue

This journal issue has two purposes. First, in focusing on moral exclusion in a variety of social contexts, the papers illustrate that moral exclusion is a productive way to conceptualize disparate social issues, the common aspect of which is that they cast victims outside the scope of justice. Unlike much of the literature on harm doing, this journal issue is not a response to one particular horror; instead, it examines in many contexts how harm emerges, gains momentum, and is justified. Although effects of moral exclusion on victims are considered (see Bar-Tal, DeWind, Fine, and Nagata—all in this issue), this is not the issue's central focus; instead, the papers closely examine the perspective of *perpetrators*—defined broadly as individuals or groups that harm others, societal institutions that justify harm, and bystanders who condone harm. The second purpose of the issue is to bring some order to this sprawling topic. In systematic analyses of causes, outcomes, and deterrence, the papers refine psychological knowledge about social issues, consolidate work from related areas, and contribute theory and analysis.

The issue is organized into three sections: the emergence and progression of moral exclusion in individuals, the emergence and progression of moral exclusion in society, and approaches to deterring moral exclusion. These sections connect papers that have a similar *primary* focus; however, most papers exceed the section title with analyses that compare individuals with groups, causes with outcomes, and theory with data.

Moral Exclusion and Injustice: In Individuals

In the first paper focusing on moral exclusion in individuals, Morton Deutsch explores the seeds of hate and destruction, and asks, "Is moral exclusion a psychological necessity?" His pithy response merges several psychologi-

cal perspectives—clinical, developmental, social, and political—to conclude that the capacity for moral splitting resides in all of us. Based on a summary of object relations theory, Deutsch proposes that moral exclusion is activated when those who have not integrated good and bad images of themselves and of significant others during early development subsequently experience adverse social circumstances and destructive forms of conflict.

Albert Bandura analyzes psychological mechanisms by which moral control is selectively disengaged from inhumane conduct in ordinary and extraordinary circumstances. Informed by research on social cognition, socialization, aggression, obedience, and attribution, his model of the disengagement of moral restraints scrutinizes many of the symptoms of moral exclusion described in the literature on sanctioned harm doing. His model classifies these symptoms into four clusters: reconstruing harmful behavior, obscuring causal agency, disregarding or misrepresenting harmful consequences, and blaming and devaluing victims. These categories not only unify theory on moral exclusion, but also contribute practical classifications for use in empirical studies.

Ervin Staub's paper on extreme harm doing, such as torture, mass killing, and genocide, examines the motivational origins of moral exclusion in individuals and connects these origins with societal conditions that enable extreme harm doing. His paper incorporates research on altruism, aggression, motivation, moral development, cognition, discrimination, and obedience. He describes how personal and cultural characteristics along with difficult life conditions perpetuate a vicious cycle of harm doing and individual and societal change. In addition to describing the progression of moral exclusion from individuals to state-supported killing, Staub identifies the potential power of bystanders—individuals, groups, and nations—to identify and deter injustice.

Moral Exclusion and Injustice: In Society

Daniel Bar-Tal's paper on delegitimization—that is, classifying groups into extremely negative categories—examines moral exclusion from the perspective of prejudice and stereotyping. Bar-Tal shows how delegitimization is a parsimonious response to threat, and he presents three models that describe the trajectory of delegitimization resulting from conflict and ethnocentrism. In these recursive models, delegitimization causes various harms that further intensify delegitimization. Bar-Tal also describes historical and political events that vividly illustrate how delegitimization occurs and gains momentum in destructive intergroup conflict.

Tom Tyler and Allan Lind present empirical data that examine the psychological origins of people's moral boundaries, particularly the effects of group memberships on procedural and distributive justice concerns. Their findings indicate that group membership is important for moral inclusion and, as group-

value theory would predict, concerns about justice are greatest among those with intermediate group status. Tyler and Lind discuss the implications of these findings for justice theory, and for moral inclusion and exclusion.

Joel Brockner describes moral inclusion and exclusion in a common societal setting, the workplace. His description of the scope of justice in this context incorporates balance theory, interpersonal attraction, victimization, and procedural and distributive justice. His field and laboratory research on survivors of organizational layoffs examines the effects of moral inclusion on organizational commitment and work performance. Brockner's data indicate that survivors' scope of justice moderates their reactions to unfairness in layoff procedures. Therefore, moral inclusion and exclusion have validity and explanatory power in work organizations.

Michelle Fine's paper elaborates on a scarcely recognized fact about another familiar societal institution, education. This important and costly social good is distributed through moral decisions about who belongs in and out of various educational contexts. In her description of justifications for exclusion in schools, Fine integrates several timely concerns about our schools: who defines and who gets "quality" education, how school integration is achieved and thwarted, and the school's role in producing high school dropouts. She identifies institutional practices that conceal and enable educational exclusion. She concludes that moral exclusion not only harms students barred from particular educational contexts; it also harms those *included*—first, by portraying social categorization and exclusion as natural, justifiable, and necessary, and second, by devaluing the characteristics of inclusive educational contexts: pluralism, diversity, and social responsibility.

Josh DeWind's analysis of the exclusion of Haitian refugees from the United States describes an ongoing occurrence of state-supported moral exclusion. DeWind focuses on the influx of Haitians in the 1970s and the actions taken by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to expel them during the 1980s. This paper documents social, political, economic, and legal factors that led to refugees being denied fair hearings on their asylum claims and being deported. It is interesting that DeWind's description of institutionalized injustice in the international arena closely resembles psychological descriptions of moral exclusion in individuals and between groups. DeWind also describes attempts by church and human rights groups to deter this injustice.

Donna Nagata describes the moral exclusion of American citizens of Japanese descent during World War II. Incorporating empirical research, justice and attribution literatures, historical scholarship, and a clinical perspective, Nagata compares perceptions of moral community, fairness, and redress for three groups and across time. She contrasts (1) the perpetrators: Caucasian Americans; (2) the victims: the Nisei, interned American citizens; and (3) the bystanders: the Sansei, children of Nisei born after World War II. Although this paper describes

moral exclusion that occurred five decades ago, its focus is on the subsequent trajectory of moral exclusion in the lives of American citizens of Japanese descent. It offers a dynamic account of the far-reaching effects of institutionalized injustice—on individuals, their progeny, and on society. Nagata's discussion of the recently enacted law that provides monetary compensation to each survivor of the internment reveals some of the difficulties in restoring justice after harm.

Deterring Moral Exclusion

Stuart Cook offers social scientists a thoughtful challenge: "Can justice researchers discover the nature of experiences that . . . promote the extension of justice to those from whom it is often withheld?" (p. 147). Cook first describes field and experimental research begun over four decades ago that sought means to promote respect and liking—moral inclusion—for lower status outgroups. His data affirm that people change their beliefs about social justice based on their experiences rather than solely through a redistribution of power in society. Cook then sketches the contours of a psychology that has the potential to foster moral inclusion and social justice. Reviewing recent empirical work on justice, stereotypes, cognition, intergroup attitude change, value change, social influence, altruism, and minority influence, he describes research focused on reducing negative stereotypes, diminishing justifications for bias, and increasing intergroup attraction, all important steps to interrupt and reverse the vicious cycle of moral exclusion and harm described in preceding papers.

Up to this point, the papers have argued that expanding moral boundaries can advance social justice. However, it would be irresponsible to ignore the difficulties engendered by moral inclusion. First, it can lead to personal vulnerability and danger. Second, it presents a formidable set of logical and psychological problems. Faye Crosby and Elisabeth Lubin address many fundamental dilemmas posed by moral inclusion: In an enlarged moral community, where does responsibility end? What is a community to do if the needs of some require restrictions on the liberties of others? How does one decide what to do without behaving paternalistically and disempowering others? How does the extended moral community deal with the resource scarcity that inevitably results from moral inclusion? The complex issues raised by these thoughtful questions move moral inclusion from a righteous notion to a complicated concept with liabilities as well as assets. Yet, the authors assert, the challenges are worthwhile because moral inclusion offers possibilities for peace and justice not otherwise obtainable.

In the final paper, Susan Opotow provides an overview of moral exclusion, focusing particularly on its detection and deterrence. She observes that a pluralistic perspective that values diversity may play a key role in combating moral

exclusion; however, it is also true that diversity can splinter as well as enlarge moral communities. The paper concludes with suggestions for needed research on moral exclusion.

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